Delaware Docket

Timely, brief summaries of cases handed down by the Delaware Court of Chancery and the Delaware Supreme Court.

 

1
Delaware Chancery Court Dismisses Claims Involving a Related Party Transaction with a Controlling Stockholder under Court of Chancery Rules 23.1 and 12(b)(6)
2
Chancery Court Dismisses Appraisal Challenge Based on Re-Titling of Shares, But Advocates For a Different Approach
3
Chancery Court Dismisses Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claims Against Company and Its Board of Directors Relating to 2014 Recapitalization, But Holds That Contract Claims May Proceed
4
Delaware Chancery Court Addresses Alleged Breaches of LLC Agreement
5
Chancery Court Dismisses Derivative Lawsuit against GM Directors Relating to Recalled Ignition Switches, Finding That Plaintiffs Failed to Show Demand Futility
6
Delaware Court of Chancery Declines to Dismiss Claims for Breach of Contract and Breach of Fiduciary Duties
7
Chancery Court Holds that Company Does Not Have to Pay Damages for Refusing to Appoint Director Represented by Counsel That is Also Representing Opposing Party in Adverse Litigation
8
Strict Interpretation of Advance Notice Bylaws Guides Chancery Court in Issuing Preliminary Injunction and Partial Final Judgment Orders
9
Fight Between Two Chemical Giants Continues: Akzo Nobel’s Claim of IP Misappropriation against Dow Chemical Survives Motion to Dismiss
10
Delaware Chancery Court Allows Disclosure of Privileged Information to LLC Members Under Garner Fiduciary Exception

Delaware Chancery Court Dismisses Claims Involving a Related Party Transaction with a Controlling Stockholder under Court of Chancery Rules 23.1 and 12(b)(6)

By Kristy Harlan and Stephanie S. Liu

In Teamsters Union 25 Health Services & Insurance Plan v. Baiera, et al, a stockholder of Orbitz Worldwide, Inc. challenged the fairness of the terms of a five-year services agreement that Orbitz entered into with a group of entities affiliated with Travelport Limited, a controlling shareholder of Orbitz when the agreement was negotiated and signed. The plaintiff asserted four derivative claims challenging the services agreement and a separate putative class claim for breach of fiduciary duty against Orbitz’s directors for allegedly violating the rules of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). Defendants moved to dismiss plaintiff’s claims under Court of Chancery Rule 23.1 for failure to make a demand or to adequately plead demand is excused and under Court of Chancery Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The Delaware Court of Chancery concluded that demand was not excused as to any of plaintiff’s derivative claims and that it was not reasonably conceivable that the plaintiff could establish that Orbitz’s directors caused Orbitz to violate the NYSE Rules. Thus, the Court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss the derivative claims under Rule 23.1 and the NYSE-related claim under Rule 12(b)(6).

Plaintiff Teamsters Union 25 Health Services & Insurance Plan (“Plaintiff”) has been a stockholder of Orbitz Worldwide, Inc. (“Orbitz”), an online travel company, at all relevant times with respect to its claims. Nominal Defendant. The Travelport Defendants (“Travelport”), which were majority owned by Defendant Blackstone Group LP (“Blackstone”), are group of entities affiliated with Travelport Limited, which provides transaction processing services to travel companies. The other defendants included Orbitz’s board of directors when the company entered into the New Agreement (the “Agreement Board”), Orbtiz’s board of directors when Plaintiff initiated this action (the “Demand Board”), and Orbitz’s current board of directors (“Current Board”).

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Chancery Court Dismisses Appraisal Challenge Based on Re-Titling of Shares, But Advocates For a Different Approach

By Annette Becker and Lauren Garraux

On July 13, 2015, Vice Chancellor J. Travis Laster issued his Memorandum Opinion in In re Appraisal of Dell Inc. in which he granted Dell’s motion for summary judgment against five institutions which owned Dell common stock and sought appraisal in connection with a going-private merger of the Company which closed in October 2013.  Though Vice Chancellor Laster acknowledged that Dell’s motion “must be granted” based on existing Delaware precedent interpreting the requirement that a stockholder who wishes to pursue appraisal “continuously hold[] such shares through the effective date of the merger,” the Vice Chancellor advocated for and urged the Delaware Supreme Court to adopt the federal law approach which, if applied, would allow the petitioners’ appraisal challenge to proceed.

In February 2013, Dell agreed to a merger in which each publicly held share of Dell common stock would be converted into the right to receive $13.75 in cash, subject to the right of stockholders to seek appraisal under Section 262 of the Delaware General Corporation Law (“DGCL”).  In July 2013, prior to the vote on the merger, five institutions who owned approximately 922,975 shares of Dell common stock (the “Petitioners” or “Funds”) in street name through their custodial banks caused Cede & Co. (“Cede”), the nominee of the Depository Trust Company (“DTC”) and the entity in whose name the shares were registered, to demand appraisal rights on their behalf .

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Chancery Court Dismisses Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claims Against Company and Its Board of Directors Relating to 2014 Recapitalization, But Holds That Contract Claims May Proceed

By Annette Becker and Lauren Garraux

In a July 8, 2015 letter opinion, Vice Chancellor John W. Noble granted in part and denied in part the motion of Capella Holdings, Inc. and Capella Healthcare, Inc. (“Capella” or the “Company”) and five Capella directors (the “Director Defendants”) (collectively, “Defendants”) to dismiss breach of fiduciary duty and breach of contract claims asserted against them by James Thomas Anderson (“Anderson”), a founder and former director and officer of Capella, relating to a 2014 recapitalization of the Company.

Anderson’s counterclaims against Defendants all arise from a recapitalization of Capella which the Director Defendants approved in April 2014.  Anderson voted against the recapitalization, which decreased Anderson’s ownership percentage in the Company, as well as that of the minority shareholders, and increased the ownership percentage of affiliates of GTCR Golder Rauner II LLC (“GTCR”), which, upon Capella’s formation, made an equity investment of approximately $206 million in the Company.

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Delaware Chancery Court Addresses Alleged Breaches of LLC Agreement

By Scott Waxman and Sophia Lee Shin

NewYork.com Internet Holdings, Inc. v. Entertainment Benefits Group, LLC, et al., involves a dispute between the two owners, each with a 50% interest, of NewYork.com Entertainment Group, LLC (“NYEG” or the “Company”). The plaintiff alleged that the Company’s board (the “Board”) was deadlocked because it had been excluded from all decision-making and sought dissolution, and the defendant counterclaimed for various breaches by the plaintiff of the Company’s operating agreement; the plaintiff then moved to strike the defendant’s counterclaim or dismiss it in its entirety. In this opinion, the court granted in part and denied in part the plaintiff’s motion to strike, and denied in its entirety the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss.

The plaintiff and defendant in this case were the two owners of NYEG. The principals of the plaintiff, NewYork.com Internet Holdings, Inc. (“NYIH”), were the original registrants of the domain name NewYork.com, a website that sells and markets travel and entertainment tickets in New York. The defendant, Entertainment Benefits Group, LLC (“EBG”), is in the business of selling and marketing travel and entertainment tickets.

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Chancery Court Dismisses Derivative Lawsuit against GM Directors Relating to Recalled Ignition Switches, Finding That Plaintiffs Failed to Show Demand Futility

By Scott Waxman and Lauren Garraux

In a June 26, 2015 Memorandum Opinion, Vice Chancellor Sam Glasscock III dismissed a derivative complaint filed by stockholders of General Motors (“GM”) relating to defective ignition switches that led to the recall of approximately 13 million GM vehicles beginning in February 2014.  According to Vice Chancellor Glasscock, Plaintiffs failed to adequately plead bad faith on the part of the GM directors named as defendants in the lawsuit and, therefore, failed to show demand futility under Chancery Rule 23.1.

The general facts underlying this derivative lawsuit have been widely publicized and relate to GM’s recall of approximately 13 million vehicles for issues with the vehicles’ ignition switch, which caused a vehicle’s engine and electrical system to shut off, disabling power steering and power brakes and causing the vehicle’s airbags to not deploy in the event of a crash.

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Delaware Court of Chancery Declines to Dismiss Claims for Breach of Contract and Breach of Fiduciary Duties

By Nick Froio and Zack Sager

In CMS Investment Holdings, LLC v. Castle, the Delaware Court of Chancery declined to dismiss claims for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duties, aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duties, and civil conspiracy, among others.

In Castle, the Plaintiff, CMS Investment Holdings, LLC, was a member of, and holder of Class A units in, RP Holdings Group, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company (the “Company”). The business of the Company (i.e., providing non-legal administrative services in connection with mortgage foreclosures) was created by the principal Defendants (i.e., five individuals who practiced law in Colorado and Arkansas). The Defendants held Class B and C units in the Company and ran the business in their various capacities as employees, officers, and managers of the Company. The Plaintiff’s complaint alleged that the Defendants, along with several of their affiliated entities, intentionally failed to make distributions to the Plaintiff, as a Class A unitholder, in favor of the Defendants in violation of the Company’s limited liability company agreement (the “LLC Agreement”). The Plaintiff also alleged that the Defendants purposefully took actions to block the Company from receiving much-needed debt refinancing, facilitated the Company‘s decline into insolvency, secretly negotiated with its creditors, and then, through their affiliated entities, purchased on favorable terms a major part of the Company’s business back from the Company in receivership.

The Plaintiff brought direct claims against the Defendants alleging (1) breach of the LLC Agreement and the implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing, (2) breach of fiduciary duties, (3) aiding and abetting breaches of fiduciary duties, (4) civil conspiracy, and (5) violation of the Delaware Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act. The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

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Chancery Court Holds that Company Does Not Have to Pay Damages for Refusing to Appoint Director Represented by Counsel That is Also Representing Opposing Party in Adverse Litigation

By Annette Becker and Priya Chadha

In Partners Healthcare Solutions Holdings, L.P. and GTCR Fund IX/A, L.P. v. Universal American Corp., Partners Healthcare Solutions Holdings, L.P. (“Partners”) sued Universal American Corporation (“UAM”), seeking damages and specific performance following a dispute as to Partners’ appointment of a director to UAM’s board.  During the litigation, the parties reached a settlement as to the specific performance aspect of the litigation, leaving only the issues of damages.  UAM filed a motion for summary judgment, which Vice Chancellor Glasscock granted.

In March 2012, Partners entered into a merger agreement with UAM, pursuant to which UAM purchased a Partners subsidiary, and Partners became one of UAM’s largest stockholders.  Partners was also given a seat for its designee on UAM’s board pursuant to a letter agreement (“Board Seat Agreement”).  That agreement provided that the designee must be independent under stock exchange rules, and granted Partners the right to name a replacement in the event that the initial designee resigned.  Partners named David Katz, a former board member of Partners, to the UAM board.

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Strict Interpretation of Advance Notice Bylaws Guides Chancery Court in Issuing Preliminary Injunction and Partial Final Judgment Orders

By William Axtman and Ryan Drzemiecki

In the ongoing dispute of Opportunity Partners L.P. v. Hill International, Inc., Vice Chancellor J. Travis Laster granted plaintiff Opportunity’s motion for preliminary injunction with respect to an annual meeting of stockholders and defendant’s motion to enter the injunction order as partial final judgment for purposes of appellate review. In reaching its decision on the preliminary injunction, the Court relied on strict interpretation of defendant Hill’s advance notice bylaws.

Defendant’s advance notice bylaws provided that stockholders’ notice of business or nominees to be presented in an annual meeting must be furnished “not less than sixty (60) days nor more than ninety (90) days prior to the meeting,” with an exception that “in the event that less than seventy (70) days notice or prior public disclosure of the annual meeting is given or made to stockholders,” the stockholders’ notice would be considered timely if received “no later than the close of business on the tenth (10th) day” thereafter.

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Fight Between Two Chemical Giants Continues: Akzo Nobel’s Claim of IP Misappropriation against Dow Chemical Survives Motion to Dismiss

By Holly Vance and Stephanie S. Liu

In Akzo Nobel Coatings, Inc. v. The Dow Chemical Company, the Delaware Court of Chancery decided a dispute between two chemical companies that were parties to a joint development agreement. Akzo Nobel Coatings Inc. (“Akzo”) alleged, among other things, that The Dow Chemical Company, doing business as Dow Advanced Materials (“Dow”), wrongfully misappropriated intellectual property that belonged in part or in whole to Akzo and breached their joint development agreement. Dow moved to dismiss pursuant to Court of Chancery Rule 12(b)(6). The Court granted the motion in part and denied in part. Specifically, Akzo’s claims for declaratory judgment and breach of contract survived, but its alternative claims for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, conversion, and unjust enrichment were dismissed.

Akzo specializes in the design, manufacture, and sale of various chemical coatings, including protective coatings for food and beverage packaging and containers. Dow develops, manufactures, and sells polymeric materials, products, and technologies, including those suitable for use in coatings for food and beverage containers. In January of 2010, the parties executed a Joint Development Agreement (“JDA”) to combine the parties’ respective areas of expertise in pursuit of the development of new protective coatings for metal food and beverage packaging containers. Depending on the resulting invention, any given project under the JDA could either be wholly owned by one of the two parties or jointly owned. Dow terminated the JDA in October of 2011, and then communicated to Akzo in May of 2012 that it intended to file two patent applications relating to potential JDA inventions. In June of 2013, Akzo filed its complaint, asserting claims for: (1) a declaratory judgment regarding Akzo’s ownership rights under the JDA; (2) breach of contract and a permanent and mandatory injunction against Dow; (3) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (4) conversion; and (5) unjust enrichment. The Court reviewed the complaint under the reasonable “conceivability” standard, the governing pleading standard in Delaware to survive a motion to dismiss, which asks whether there is a “possibility” of recovery.

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Delaware Chancery Court Allows Disclosure of Privileged Information to LLC Members Under Garner Fiduciary Exception

By Scott Waxman and Claire White

In De Vries v. Del Mar, L.L.C., two minority limited liability company members of Del Mar, L.L.C. (the “Company”) sought to compel disclosure of privileged information relating to the settlement of a $3.0 million loan to the Company, the transfer of the Company’s primary asset to the lender in post-settlement negotiations, and potential mismanagement and self-dealing by the managing member of the Company, Baja Management, LLC (“Baja”), and its president and sole managing member, Kenneth Jowdy (“Jowdy”). The Court held that the plaintiffs demonstrated sufficient “good cause” to compel inspection of privileged books and records of the Company related to the post-settlement events under the Garner doctrine of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, adopted by the Delaware Supreme Court in Wal-Mart Stores v. Indiana Electrical Workers Pension Trust Fund IBEW, No. 614, 2013 (Del. July 23, 20

The Company was formed for the principal purpose of owning and developing a hotel, golf course and residential properties in Baja California, Mexico, and its main asset consisted of 9,238 acres of undeveloped land, valued at $68.9 million (the “Property”). Baja, the Company’s majority and managing member, owned 93% of the Company’s membership interests, and the remaining interests were held by various minority members who invested $500,000 each in exchange for a 0.5% interest in a private placement round in 2005. The Company obtained a secured loan of $3.0 million from a “hard money” lender in 2006, but failed to raise substantial investment funds for full development of the Property. Jowdy, the sole managing member of Baja, personally guaranteed the loan. In 2010, the Company defaulted on the loan, and the Company and Jowdy executed confessions of judgment for the full amount of the loan (and interest). Following settlement negotiations, and the Company’s inability to satisfy the judgments with further financing, the Company agreed to transfer the Property to the lender in lieu of the lender recording the judgments against the Company and Jowdy.

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