Delaware Docket – Page 41 – Timely, brief summaries of cases handed down by the Delaware Court of Chancery and the Delaware Supreme Court.

Chancery Court Approves Books and Records Request of Person Wearing Both Member and Manager Hats and Confirms That Only One Proper Purpose Is Necessary

Feb 18 2016

By Scott E. Waxman and Annamarie C. Larson

Plaintiff George Polk served dual roles in relation to RED Parent LLC (the “Company”). Polk was both a manager of the Company and an indirect owner of the Company through his interest in one of the Company’s members. In RED Capital Investment L.P. v. RED Parent LLC, the court held that “[b]ecause Polk made a proper request in his capacity as Manager and stated a proper purpose, and because the requested information is within RED Parent’s control, he is entitled, pursuant to Section 18-305(b), to inspect the requested books and records.”

Chancery Court Determines Appropriate Standard of Review for Cash Flow “Tunneling” by Controlling Stockholder

Feb 13 2016

By David Forney and Eric Taylor

In In Re EZCorp Inc. Consulting Agreement Derivative Litigation, C.A. No. 9962-VCL (Del. Ch. January 25, 2016) (Laster, V.C.) the Delaware Court of Chancery granted in part and denied in part a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, but at its heart the ruling addressed the proper standard of review in a case alleging self-dealing by a controlling stockholder for “tunneling” cash flow and receiving non-ratable benefits from related-party services agreements. After a detailed and extensive analysis, the court held that the entire fairness standard of review, and not the business judgment standard of review, applied to non-merger business transactions where controlling stockholders can exact non-ratable benefits from the company, regardless of the type of transaction or method of extraction.

Chancery Court Finds that Its Broad Authority to Validate Defective Corporate Acts Could Conceivably Compel a Corporation to Sell $5 Million of Stock Without Board Authorization or a Written Agreement

Feb 12 2016

By Shoshannah Katz and B. Ashby Hardesty, Jr.

Citing the Chancery Court’s broad discretionary authority to validate defective corporate acts, Vice Chancellor Noble denied a defendant corporation’s motion to dismiss, ruling that it was “reasonably conceivable” that a plaintiff hedge fund could successfully compel the corporation to sell to it approximately $5 million worth of stock, despite the board of directors’ failure to authorize the transaction or to memorialize it in writing.

Chancery Court Clarifies How the Defense of Release Can Be Raised, Applies the Unocal Test to Allegedly Defensive Board Actions, and Weighs the Materiality of Proxy Statement Omissions

Feb 12 2016

By: Scott E. Waxman and David Valenti

In deciding a motion to dismiss derivative and direct shareholder claims, the Delaware Chancery Court addresses the defense of release, examines whether allegedly defensive board actions trigger the heightened Unocal test, and judges the materiality of proxy statement omissions. Although the Court made clear that the affirmative defense of release could be considered in a motion to dismiss, it held that Plaintiffs’ claims did not have the “same identical factual predicate” with previously settled federal class litigation. The Court also applied the Unocal test in analyzing whether the alleged adoption of entrenchment measures state a viable claim, and discussed the standard for pleading material omissions to a proxy statement.

In In re Ebix, Inc. Stockholder Litigation, Plaintiff shareholders brought six claims against Ebix, Inc., (“Ebix”) and its board of directors (the “Board”) arising out of several actions taken by the Board in the lead up to a later abandoned merger attempt. Claims I-III challenged several documents that related to executive compensation arrangements made by Ebix and approved by its Board. Claims IV-V challenged several of the Board’s actions as breaches of its fiduciary duties on the grounds that each constituted an improper entrenchment device by the board, including Ebix’s entry into a Director Nomination Agreement (the “DNA”) with a dissenting shareholder and its adoption of a bundle of new bylaws. In claim VI, Plaintiffs alleged the Board breached its fiduciary duties by issuing a materially misleading and incomplete 2014 Proxy Statement and sought a declaration that the 2014 Annual Shareholders’ Meeting’s actions were invalid.

Chancery Court Rejects Disclosure-Only Settlement and Signals Move Towards Greater Scrutiny of Disclosure-Based Settlements

Feb 02 2016

By Lisa Stark and Trevor Belton

In In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litigation, C.A. No. 10020-CB (Del. Ch. Jan. 22, 2016), the Delaware Court of Chancery rejected a proposed disclosure-only settlement because the proposed disclosures were not “plainly” material and the settlement lacked sufficient consideration to warrant the broad release sought by defendants. The court stated that litigants who pursue disclosure-only settlements can expect “increasingly vigilant scrutiny” of the fairness of the “give” and “get” of such settlements. The court also used the opinion to discuss, more broadly, the dynamics that have led to the proliferation of disclosure settlements; focusing mainly on the concern that these settlements rarely yield genuine benefits for stockholders.

This action arose from the acquisition of Trulia, Inc. (“Trulia”) by Zillow, Inc. (“Zillow”) pursuant to a stock-for-stock merger. Following the announcement of the merger, certain Trulia stockholders brought actions in the Court of Chancery, alleging that the Trulia directors breached their fiduciary duties by approving the proposed merger at an unfair exchange rate and by disseminating inadequate disclosures in connection with the solicitation of the stockholder vote on the merger.

A Fiduciary’s Personal Benefit Can Preclude the Approval of A Settlement Agreement if the Personal Benefit is Not Fair and Reasonable

Jan 28 2016

By: Megan Wotherspoon and Calvin Kennedy

By letter-order dated January 14, 2016, Vice Chancellor John W. Noble found that a fiduciary’s self-dealing and personal benefit may preclude the approval of a settlement agreement. By this order, the court refused to approve the proposed settlement because of the equity buyback provision made available only to the plaintiff fiduciary.

In Smollar v. Potarazu, the plaintiff Marvin Smollar (“Smollar”) brought a derivative action on behalf of nominal defendant VitalSpring Technologies, Inc. (“VitalSpring”) against defendant Sreedhar Potarazu, VitalSpring’s Chief Executive Officer (“Potarazu”). Following litigation of the matter, a settlement agreement was agreed to between the parties and submitted to the court for approval (the “Settlement Agreement”). In addition to the relief sought on behalf of VitalSpring, the Settlement Agreement granted Smollar, but not other VitalSpring stockholders, the right to sell Smollar’s shares in VitalSpring back to VitalSpring for the same amount he had purchased it fifteen years ago (the “Buyback Provision”). Other VitalSpring stockholders accordingly objected to the Settlement Agreement and argued that Smollar engaged in a form of self-dealing while serving as a fiduciary.

Delaware Supreme Court Affirms Financial Advisor Liability for Aiding and Abetting

Jan 05 2016

By Whitney Smith and Elise Gabriel

The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed RBC Capital Markets, LLC’s (“RBC”) liability for aiding and abetting a board’s fiduciary breaches based on RBC’s undisclosed conflicts of interest and its deliberately misleading the board during the company’s sales process. The Court also upheld the Chancery Court’s finding that RBC bore 83% responsibility for the shareholders’ damages, resulting in a $75 million award against RBC, plus pre- and post-judgment interest.

In RBC Capital Markets, LLC, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Chancery Court’s holding that RBC was liable for aiding and abetting breaches of fiduciary duty by the board of Rural/Metro Corporation (“Rural”) in connection with the sale of Rural to private equity firm Warburg Pincus LLC (“Warburg”). The Rural board’s underlying breaches of fiduciary duties were its failure to be actively and reasonably informed when overseeing the sales process and to be adequately informed about Rural’s value, and also its breach of the duty of disclosure for including RBC’s flawed valuation analysis as well as false and misleading information about RBC’s conflicts of interest in the company’s proxy statement. RBC, in turn, knowingly induced the breaches by exploiting its own conflicted interests to the detriment of Rural and by creating an “information vacuum” for the Rural board in order to push the sale forward.

Chancery Court Grants in Part and Denies in Part Motion to Dismiss in Fraud Dispute

Dec 16 2015

By Eric Feldman and James Parks

On a motion to dismiss in Prairie Capital III, L.P. v. Double E Holding Corp., the Delaware Court of Chancery, granting in part and denying in part the defendant’s motion, re-enforced the importance of bargained-for contractual terms in the context of a dispute over a transaction consummated pursuant to a stock purchase agreement.

The case involves a transaction between two private equity firms, Prairie Capital Partners and Incline Equity Partners. Prairie Capital Partners, through its sponsored funds Prairie Capital III, L.P and Prairie Capital III QP, L.P. (collectively, “Prairie Capital”), owned Double E Parent LLC (the “Company”), a portfolio company, which it sold to Double E Holding Corp., which was an acquisition vehicle formed by Incline Equity Partners III, L.P., which was sponsored by Incline Equity Partners (collectively the “Buyer”). Prairie Capital III L.P. and Prairie Capital III QP, L.P. (the “Sellers”) were the principal sellers, and the Stock Purchase Agreement (the “SPA”) was signed and the transaction closed on April 4, 2012. The SPA established an escrow fund for a limited period of time for the parties’ respective indemnification obligations and included procedures to make a claim against such escrow fund.

Chancery Court Holds That a Limited Partner’s Claims are Dual-Natured and Can Be Pursued After a Related-Party Merger; $171 Million Award to Be Recovered Pro Rata By Unaffiliated Limited Partners

Dec 09 2015

By Scott Waxman and Joshua Haft

The Chancery Court held that a plaintiff’s claim that a general partner was liable for breach of a limited partnership agreement, for which the general partner was previously found liable by the Chancery Court, was best viewed as a dual-natured claim. Dual-natured claims should be viewed as derivative for purposes of Chancery Court Rule 23.1 and the demand doctrine, but should be viewed as direct for purposes of claim termination after a merger that extinguished a limited partnership. Thus, the Chancery Court granted pro-rata recovery of a liability award for breach of a limited partnership agreement to limited partners who were not affiliated with the general partner at the time of the related-party merger that resulted in termination of the limited partnership.

Chancery Court Denies Defendant Fund Manager’s Request to Pay Ongoing Legal Fees from Disputed Assets; Permits Payment of Administrative Fees Incurred in Completing Necessary SEC and Tax Filings

Dec 07 2015

By Scott Waxman and Max Kaplan

By letter-order dated November 25, 2015, Vice Chancellor John W. Noble issued a “Status Quo Order” in Capital Link Fund I, LLC v. Capital Point Management, LP. By this order, the court approved disbursement of certain administrative fees sought by defendants from the assets in dispute, but denied defendants’ request to pay its legal fees from the same disputed assets.

Plaintiffs in this action are limited partners to an investment fund of which defendant Capital Point Management, LP (“CPMLP”) is the general partner. In July of 2014, CPMLP caused the partnership to sell all of its assets to defendant Princeton Capital Corporation (“Princeton Capital”)—a CPMLP affiliate. Plaintiffs allege that CPMLP, in violation of the controlling partnership agreement, did so without providing notice to or obtaining approval from the limited partners or the partnership’s Board of Advisors.