Delaware Docket – Page 23 – Timely, brief summaries of cases handed down by the Delaware Court of Chancery and the Delaware Supreme Court.

Chancery Court Denies Appraisal Rights Where a Stockholders’ Agreement Requires that Stockholders Refrain from Appraisal Petition

Nov 06 2018

In a letter opinion, Manti Holdings, LLC et al. v. Authentix Acquisition Co, Civil Action No. 2017-0887-SG (Del. Ch. October 1, 2018), the Delaware Court of Chancery denied the petitioning stockholders’ cross-motion for statutory appraisal rights under Section 262 of the DGCL, ruling that the stockholders were contractually barred from asserting such rights regarding a merger of respondent Authentix Acquisition Co. (the “Company” and “Respondent”). The Court held that the terms of a stockholders agreement (the “SA”) imposed a duty on Manti Holdings, LLC and the other moving stockholders (“Petitioners”) to forebear from the exercise of their appraisal rights, and granted Respondent’s motion for partial summary judgment on the statutory entitlement to appraisal rights.

Court of Chancery Judicially Validates Company’s Ratification of Defective Corporate Acts, Therefore Rejecting Bid to Unwind Merger

Oct 30 2018

By Holly Hatfield and B. Ashby Hardesty, Jr.

In Charles Almond, et al. v. Glenhill Advisors LLC, et al., C.A. No. 10477-CB, Chancellor Bouchard ruled in favor of the defendants, directors of furniture company Design Within Reach Inc. (the “Company”) and Glenhill Capital Management LP (“Glenhill”), on all of the plaintiff-investors’ claims relating to the 2014 acquisition of DWR by Herman Miller, Inc. (“Herman Miller”). In doing so, Chancellor Bouchard judicially validated certain measures taken by Herman Miller to rectify an error that had diluted its ownership stake in the Company. Chancellor Bouchard also dismissed claims challenging transactions through which the Company’s board members received additional equity in the Company before the merger, holding that because these claims were derivative in nature, the plaintiffs’ standing to bring such claims were extinguished because of the merger.

CHANCERY COURT GRANTS MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION REGARDING ENFORCEMENT OF FORUM SELECTION CLAUSE

Oct 24 2018

By: Scott Waxman and Greyson Blue

In Village Green Holding, LLC, et al. v. Jonathan Holtzman, et al., Vice Chancellor Tamika Montgomery-Reeves granted plaintiff Village Green Holding, LLC’s (“Village Green”) motion for preliminary injunction regarding the enforcement of a forum selection clause and defendant Jonathan Holtzman’s (“Holtzman”) attempt to litigate a dispute in a separate forum. In rendering its decision, the Court illustrated the circumstances under which it will enjoin litigation that is pending in an alternate forum pursuant to a contract’s forum selection clause.

Chancery Court Finds No Breach of Duty in Failed Corporate Inversion

Oct 17 2018

By Joanna Diakos and Tom Sperber

In Kyle Ellis (AbbVie, Inc.) v. Richard A. Gonzalez, et al., the Delaware Chancery Court dismissed a derivative suit for failing to make a demand and to allege particularized facts demonstrating that demand would have been futile. Kyle Ellis (“Plaintiff”) alleged breaches of fiduciary duty by the CEO of AbbVie, Inc. (“AbbVie”), Richard A. Gonzalez (“Gonzalez”), and the individual members of AbbVie’s board of directors (“Director Defendants”) in connection with a proposed but ultimately abandoned corporate inversion between pharmaceutical giants AbbVie and Shire plc (“Shire”). The Court held that because AbbVie’s certificate of incorporation contained a Section 102(b)(7) exculpatory clause, Plaintiff had to allege that a majority of the board faced a substantial likelihood of liability for breaching the duty of loyalty in order for demand to be excused. Ultimately, Plaintiff failed to do that.

At all relevant times, Plaintiff was a minority stockholder of AbbVie, a Delaware corporation headquartered in Chicago, Illinois. Shire was an Island of Jersey biopharmaceutical company with its headquarters in Dublin, Ireland.

CHANCERY COURT FINDS THAT LANGUAGE OF LIMITED PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT GOVERNS WHICH CLAIMS SURVIVE SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN MASTER LIMITED PARTNERSHIP’S RELATED PARTY TRANSACTION

Oct 17 2018

By Scott Waxman and Adrienne Wimberly

In Mesirov v. Enbridge Company, Inc., et al. C.A. No. 11314-VCS (Del. Ch. Aug.29, 2018), the Delaware Chancery Court dismissed five of eight counts alleged with respect to a transaction where Enbridge Energy Company (EEP) repurchased for $1 billion a two-thirds interest in Alberta Clipper Pipelines (AC interest), despite the fact that EEP had sold that same interest years prior for $800 million and the business had steadily declined since such sale. The dismissals were based primarily upon the language and obligations included in EEP’s limited partnership agreement.

Delaware Chancery Court Makes Groundbreaking “Material Adverse Effect” Finding Allowing Buyer to Terminate Merger Agreement

Oct 12 2018

By: Peter Flocos, Lisa Stark, Rick Giovannelli and Mark Hammes

In a landmark decision, a Delaware court has, for what is widely believed to be the first time ever, found that a material adverse effect actually occurred in an acquisition transaction, giving the buyer a right to terminate the pending transaction. In Akorn, Inc. v. Fresenius Kabi AG,[1] the Delaware Court of Chancery (the “Court”) held, following a trial, that the buyer properly terminated the parties’ merger agreement, due to such a material adverse effect between signing and closing, under the terms of the agreement and the pertinent Delaware case law. Unlike prior decisions rejecting buyer material adverse effect claims,[2] the Court found that a pre-closing decline in the business of the target – Akorn – was not merely a “cyclical trend” and was likely to have a post-closing, durationally-significant effect that was “material when viewed from the longer-term perspective of a reasonable acquiror.”[3] Although groundbreaking, the Akorn decision reflects that the Delaware courts will still approach the question of whether an MAE has occurred on a case-by-case basis and does not establish a particular “bright line” test.

Chancery Court Claims for Breach of Fiduciary Duty Dismissed for Failure to Establish Demand Futility

Oct 10 2018

By: Annette Becker and Geoffrey Locher

Jennifer L. Stritzinger v. Dennis Barba, et al., letter opinion 180831

In Jennifer L. Stritzinger v. Dennis Barba, et al. Civil Action No. 12776-CB, the Delaware Court of Chancery granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss Stritzinger’s derivative lawsuit for breach of fiduciary duty for alleged mismanagement of Newark Country Club (the “Club”), a private corporation located in Newark, Delaware. The Court dismissed Stritzinger’s suit finding Stritzinger failed to establish demand futility before filing suit against the Club.

Some Claims Survive Summary Judgment in the Ebix Shareholder Litigation

Sep 25 2018

By: Josh Gaul and Samira Torshizi

Only a handful of the claims survived summary judgment in the recent order issued by Vice Chancellor Joseph R. Slights III in In re Ebix, Inc. Stockholder Litig. This was the third major ruling in a five-year-old, repeatedly amended stockholder suit that involved stock incentives, a past acquisition bonus, and allegedly inadequate disclosures. Of the ten causes of action, the only ones to survive summary judgment were claims for breach of fiduciary duty to disclose material facts that alleged false or misleading disclosures that could have altered deliberations of a reasonable shareholder.

The surviving disputes, which are now headed to trial, concerns three documents that created executive compensation arrangements in 2009 and 2010: (1) an Acquisition Bonus Agreement (“ABA”) that Ebix, Inc. (“Ebix”) entered into with Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Robin Raina in 2009; (2) a 2010 Stock Incentive Plan (the “2010 Plan”), (3) a proxy statement issued before Ebix’s 2010 annual meeting (the “2010 Proxy Statement”) in which Ebix’s board of directors (“Board”) recommended approval of the 2010 Plan, and (4) the proxy statement issued in 2016 that included the 2016 CEO bonus plan (the “2016 Proxy Statement”). Read More

DISPUTE OVER PUT RIGHT ILLUSTRATES THE POTENTIAL PITFALLS OF AMBIGUOUS CONTRACT LANGUAGE

Sep 20 2018

By: David Forney and Adam Heyd

In QC Holdings, Inc. v. Allconnect, Inc., C.A. No. 2017-0715-JTL (Del. Ch. August 28, 2018), plaintiff QC Holdings, Inc. (“QC Holdings”), a former stockholder of defendant Allconnect, Inc. (the “Company”), brought a claim against the Company to enforce its right (the “Put Right”) under a Put Agreement to sell its Company shares (the “Put Shares”) to the Company in exchange for $5 million (the “Put Price”). The Company had refused to pay the Put Price on the basis that it was contractually restricted from doing so on the date required under the Put Agreement, and therefore the Put Right was extinguished and never survived a subsequent merger of the Company when those restrictions arguably lifted. The Delaware Court of Chancery held that the Company’s arguments would have resulted in an improper forfeiture of QC Holdings’ contractual rights to the Put Price and that the exercise of the Put Right constituted a redemption of the Put Shares prior to the merger and a continuing contractual obligation by the Company to pay the Put Price. The Court ordered the Company to pay the Put Price to QC Holdings out of an escrow set up at the merger closing for this purpose.

CHANCERY COURT VALIDATES A DEFECTIVE MERGER AND REAFFIRMS RELIANCE ON OUTSIDE LEGAL COUNSEL UNDER DELAWARE LAW

Sep 20 2018

By Holly Hatfield and Dean Brazier

In The Cirillo Family Trust v. Aram Moezinia, Lewis Tepper, Mark Walter, and DAVA Pharmaceuticals, Inc., C.A. No. 10116-CB (Del. Ch. Jul. 11, 2018), the Delaware Chancery Court granted the defendants’ motion dismissing certain claims arising from the 2014 merger between DAVA Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“DAVA”) and an affiliate of Endo Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (such affiliate, “Endo”). The Court held that Section 205 of the Delaware General Corporation Law (the “DGCL”) validated deficiencies in the written consents to the merger (the “Written Consents”) and a director’s reasonable, good faith reliance on the advice of legal counsel hired for specific expertise can exculpate the director for a fiduciary duty breach. The Court also granted part of the plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint to add a claim against certain directors in their capacities as officers of DAVA.