Catagory:Indemnification

1
Court of Chancery Reallocates Limited Liability Company Distributions According to Prior Agreements between the Parties
2
Chancery Court Confirms Delaware’s Merger Statutes Inapplicable to Options
3
Court of Chancery Discusses Statute of Limitations in Claim for Indemnification
4
A Corporation’s Advancement of Legal Fees and Expenses to Its Officers and Directors
5
Pontone v. Milso, C.A. No. 8842-VCP (August 22, 2014) (Parsons, V.C.)
6
Kostyszyn v. Martuscelli, et al., C.A. No. 8828-MA (July 14, 2014)
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Branin v. Stein Roe Investment Counsel, LLC, et. al, C.A. No 8481 (June 30, 2014) (Noble, V.C.)

Court of Chancery Reallocates Limited Liability Company Distributions According to Prior Agreements between the Parties

By Andrew Skouvakis and Thomas Meyer

In Finger Lakes Capital Partners, LLC v. Honeoye Lake Acquisition, LLC, the Court of Chancery held that proceeds from a limited liability company’s liquidity event distributed to the members of the limited liability company should be reallocated in accordance with prior agreements between the members. The Court found that an integration clause in the limited liability company agreement did not supersede allocation provisions in the prior agreements.

In 2003, Zubin Mehta and Gregory Shalov formed Finger Lakes Capital Partners, LLC (“Finger Lakes”) to sponsor investments in portfolio companies. Lyrical Partners, L.P. (“Lyrical”) provided the majority of the capital for these investments. In 2004, Mehta, Shalov, and Lyrical executed a binding term sheet (the “Term Sheet”) addressing the ongoing business relationship between Finger Lakes and Lyrical. Under the Term Sheet, Lyrical received a 25% ownership interest in Finger Lakes and was entitled to a percentage of portfolio company management fees that would otherwise go to Finger Lakes.

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Chancery Court Confirms Delaware’s Merger Statutes Inapplicable to Options

By Lisa Stark and Eric Jay

In Kurt Fox v. CDX Holdings, Inc. (f/k/a Caris Life Sciences, Inc.), C.A. No. 8031-VCL (Del. Ch. July 28, 2015), the Delaware Court of Chancery confirmed that Delaware’s merger statutes do not effect a statutory conversion of options at the effective time of a merger. Rather, the treatment of stock options in a merger is governed by the underlying stock option plan, which must be amended in connection with a merger if the treatment of options in the merger differs from the treatment contemplated by the plan. The Court also confirmed that a standard qualification in stock option plans, requiring a corporation’s board of directors to determine the fair market value of the option for purposes of cashing out the options, could not be satisfied by informal board action or a delegation to management or a third party.

This class action arose from a 2011 spin-off/merger transaction pursuant to which Miraca Holdings, Inc. (“Miraca”) acquired CDX Holdings, Inc. (formerly known as Caris Life Sciences, Inc.) (“Caris”) for $725 million (the “Merger”). Immediately prior to the Merger, Caris spun off two of its three subsidiaries to its stockholders (the “Spin-Off”). In the Merger, each share of Caris stock was converted into the right to receive $4.46 in cash. Each option was terminated with the right to receive the difference between $5.07 per share and the exercise price of the option, minus 8% of the total option proceeds, which were held back to fund an escrow account from which Miraca could satisfy indemnification claims brought post-closing.

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Court of Chancery Discusses Statute of Limitations in Claim for Indemnification

By Scott Waxman and Stephanie S. Liu

In Francis S. Branin, Jr. v. Stein Roe Investment Counsel, LLC, et al, the Court of Chancery considered whether Plaintiff’s claim for indemnification for expenditures related to litigation that had begun in 2002, but not was resolved with finality until 2012, was time-barred. The Court concluded that the statute of limitations on Branin’s indemnification claim did not begin to run until the underlying litigation was resolved, and thus his claim was timely. The Court granted Branin’s motion to strike Defendants’ affirmative defenses and granted his motion for summary judgment on Defendants’ obligation to indemnify him. The Court also found that Branin was entitled to prejudgment simple interest at the statutory legal rate, as well as fees incurred in successfully prosecuting his indemnification claim.

After Plaintiff Francis S. Branin, Jr. (“Branin” or the “Plaintiff”) resigned from Bessemer Trust, N.A. (“Bessemer”) on July 12, 2002, he began working for Defendant Stein Roe Investment Counsel LLC (“SRIC LLC”). On November 22, 2002, Bessemer sued Branin for improperly soliciting its clients and impairing its goodwill in violation of a New York implied covenant (“New York Action”). In 2012, after a decade of litigation, Branin successfully defended against all claims. On April 17, 2013, Branin turned to the Court to enforce a purported indemnification right against SRIC LLC, Stein Roe Investment Counsel, Inc., and Atlantic Trust Group, Inc. (collectively, the “Defendants”).

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A Corporation’s Advancement of Legal Fees and Expenses to Its Officers and Directors

By Holly Vance and Sophia Lee Shin

This case involves a plaintiff who sought advancement for his legal fees and expenses in connection with insider trading charges. In opining on the defendant’s motion to dismiss or stay the action and the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, the Court considered various issues, including the four-factor analysis of McWane and the difference between advancement and indemnification.

Nipro Diagnostics, Inc. (“Nipro”), the defendant, acquired Home Diagnostics, Inc. (“HDI”) on March 15, 2010. Soon after the merger, the SEC began an investigation of George H. Holley (“Holley”), the founder and chairman of HDI and the plaintiff in this case, for suspicious trading in HDI stock around the time of the merger announcement (the “SEC Investigation”). On May 20, 2010, Holley requested that HDI advance his expenses in the SEC Investigation, and executed an undertaking (required with any advancement) promising to repay HDI for any advanced expenses if it were ultimately determined that Holley was not entitled to indemnification. From June 2010 to November 2010, Nipro advanced Holley’s expenses relating to the SEC Investigation. On January 13, 2011, the SEC commenced an action against Holley for violating federal securities laws by disclosing information about the merger (the “SEC Action”). On February 4, 2011, Holley was indicted in the U.S. District Court for the State of New Jersey for insider trading (the “Criminal Action”). On August 19, 2011, the New Jersey U.S. Attorney’s Office obtained a stay of the SEC Action. Holley eventually pled guilty to two counts of insider trading in the Criminal Action.

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Pontone v. Milso, C.A. No. 8842-VCP (August 22, 2014) (Parsons, V.C.)

By Jamie Bruce and Mark Hammes

This case involves a claim for advancement of legal fees by plaintiff Scott Pontone (“Pontone”), a director and officer of two Delaware corporations, based on indemnification and expense advancement provisions of the corporations’ bylaws. Faced with both a motion to dismiss for lack of standing and Pontone’s motion for summary judgment, the Court granted in part and denied in part the  motion to dismiss, and granted partial summary judgment in Pontone’s favor with respect to advancement of certain legal fees and expenses.  The Court also found that Pontone was entitled to advancement as to 75% of his “fees on fees” in prosecuting this action.

Pontone was the Vice President of Old Milso, a New York regional casket manufacturer, when it was acquired by The York Group, Inc. (“York”) in 2005.  After the acquisition, Pontone served as a director and Executive Vice President of Both York and the successor entity Milso Industries Corporation (“New Milso”) until 2007.  In May 2010, Pontone entered into a consulting arrangement with a competitor, Batesville Casket Company (“Batesville”).  In August 2010, York and New Milso instituted an action in a federal court in Pennsylvania (the “Underlying Action”) against Pontone and Batesville alleging that they engaged in a wrongful scheme to induce several employees and many of their most lucrative customers to switch to Batesville.  The Underlying Action is still ongoing.

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Kostyszyn v. Martuscelli, et al., C.A. No. 8828-MA (July 14, 2014)

By Annette Becker and Lauren Garraux

On July 14, 2014, Master in Chancery Kim E. Ayvazian issued her draft report in Kostyszn v. Martuscelli, a dispute between the purchasers (“Plaintiffs”) and sellers (“Defendants”) of Paciugo Gelato and Café (the “Business”), an ongoing business which Plaintiffs purchased in December 2011 for a purchase price of $272,500.00.  According to Plaintiffs, their decision to purchase the Business and the purchase price were based on sales information provided to them by Defendants, as well as subsequent statements made by Defendants regarding, among other things, business earnings, on-site sales, catering sales and profits.

In August 2013, Plaintiffs commenced a lawsuit against Defendants in the Delaware Chancery Court alleging that this information and Defendants’ statements were false and misleading, and directly resulted in Plaintiffs both calculating a purchase price that was more than they otherwise would have been willing to pay for the Business and entering into a long-term lease exposing the assets of the Business to risk and the Plaintiffs to personal liability if the Business ultimately failed.  In their amended complaint (the “Amended Complaint”), Plaintiffs asserted claims against Defendants for breach of contract, breach of warranty, indemnification, equitable fraud, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, intentional misrepresentation and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and sought indemnification and monetary damages from Defendants, as well as cancellation of the agreement to purchase the Business.  Defendants moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint on grounds that the Chancery Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims.  In her draft report, Master Ayvazian recommended that the Court dismiss Plaintiffs’ equitable claim (for equitable fraud) with prejudice, decline to apply the “clean up” doctrine to address Plaintiffs’ remaining legal claims and to allow Plaintiffs to transfer those remaining legal claims to a court of law.

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Branin v. Stein Roe Investment Counsel, LLC, et. al, C.A. No 8481 (June 30, 2014) (Noble, V.C.)

By Eric Taylor and Jamie Bruce

This is a case dealing primarily with two issues: 1) when does an employee’s claim for indemnification from a Delaware LLC irrevocably accrue?; and 2) if a party has a viable claim for indemnification but is on notice that the agreement providing for indemnification may be modified, could a later amendment to such agreement defeat the claim? The Court held that it must look to the operating agreement in place when the events giving rise to the employee’s claim for indemnification accrued or when the lawsuit involving the claim was filed and that if such employee was entitled to indemnification under that agreement, the employee’s claim is vested. The Court further held that, once vested, the contractual right to indemnification could not be eliminated by a subsequent amendment to the agreement.

The plaintiff in this case, Francis Branin, Jr. (“Branin”), was a principal/owner and the CEO of an investment management firm that was sold in October 2000 to a larger investment management firm, Bessemer Trust, N.A. (“Bessemer”), at which time Branin became an employee of Bessemer. Branin later began meeting with Stein Roe Investment Counsel, LLC (“SRIC”) to discuss possible employment. During those discussions, Branin explained to SRIC that the sale of his prior investment firm was governed by an implied covenant in New York restricting the seller of a business from approaching former customers to regain their patronage after he has purported to transfer their “goodwill” to the purchaser. Under this “Mohawk doctrine”, Branin could not solicit his former clients, but he would be entitled to accept the business of his former clients if they approached him. With that knowledge, SRIC decided to hire Branin in July 2002. Branin claims that he did not solicit his former clients, but less than a year after he joined SRIC he was managing 30 client accounts that he had previously managed. Branin was sued by Bessemer alleging improper solicitation of clients. After nearly ten years of litigation, Bessemer unconditionally dismissed its suit and all claims against Branin. Branin is seeking indemnification from SRIC for more than $3 million in legal fees incurred in the litigation.

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