Entire Fairness – Page 4 – Delaware Docket

Lake Treasure Holdings, Ltd., et al v. Foundry Hill GP, LLC, et al and Foundry Hill Holdings, LP and CP-1 LLC, C.A. No. 6546-VCL (October 10, 2014) (Laster, V.C.)

Oct 15 2014

In Lake Treasure Holdings, Ltd., the plaintiffs, investors in a now-defunct start-up, Foundry Hill Holdings LP (the “Partnership”), sued the Partnership, one of its founders (Ulric Taylor (“Taylor”)), one of Taylor’s subsequent business partners (Christopher Klee (“Klee”)), and various other Partnership-related entities and operating subsidiaries for breach of fiduciary duty and aiding and abetting the breach of fiduciary duty, as well as under the Delaware Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (“DUFTA”) and Delaware Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“DUTSA”), in connection with a series of transactions whereby all of the assets of the Partnership were ultimately transferred to entities owned and/or controlled by Taylor and Klee.

Taylor controlled the Partnership through his control of the Partnership’s general partner. As a result, the Court initially found that Taylor owed fiduciary duties, including the duty of loyalty, to the Partnership and its limited partners. In analyzing the transactions at issue, the Court further found that Taylor stood on both sides of such transactions and that therefore the entire fairness standard applied in analyzing such transactions. In applying the entire fairness test, the Court held that Taylor had breached his duty of loyalty when he granted a security interest in all of the assets of the Partnership, including its primary asset, high frequency trading software, to Klee in exchange for a $28,000 loan from Klee to the Partnership. Prior to the $28,000 loan by Klee, Taylor and Klee had previously contemplated Klee purchasing the software for $500,000 with an enterprise valuation of $3 million. 3 months following the granting of the security interest, as foreseen by Taylor and Klee at the time the loan was made, the Partnership defaulted on the loan, Klee foreclosed on the security interest, and Taylor amicably surrendered all of the assets of the Partnership, including all interest in the software, to an entity controlled by Klee. The Court determined that Taylor and Klee “acted in concert to move the Partnership’s high frequency trading software out of the Partnership and into an entity where Taylor and Klee could enjoy its benefits.” Upon finding the fiduciary duty breach by Taylor, the Court then also found that Klee had aided and abetted such breach of fiduciary duty.

In re Cornerstone Therapeutics Inc. Stockholder Litigation, Consolidated C.A. No. 8922-VCG (Sept. 26, 2014) (Glasscock, V.C.)

Oct 08 2014

By Annette Becker and Mark Hammes

In In Re Cornerstone Therapeutics Inc. S’holder Litig., 2014 WL 4418169 (Del. Ch. Sept. 10, 2014), Defendant directors of Cornerstone Therapeutics Inc. (“Cornerstone”) brought a motion to dismiss based on an exculpatory provision in Cornerstone’s certificate of incorporation pursuant to Section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Laws in the context of a controlling stockholder freeze-out merger. In the memorandum opinion, the Court denied the motion to dismiss, finding that, since entire fairness applied to the transaction at the outset, the director defendants must await a determination of entire fairness at trial before the Court could consider whether they were exculpated by the provision. The director defendants moved for interlocutory appeal under Delaware Supreme Court Rule 42 challenging the denial of the Court’s decision regarding the motion to dismiss.

This decision considers the motion for interlocutory appeal. The Court held that the defendant directors are entitled to an interlocutory appeal of the order denying the motion to dismiss. An interlocutory appeal may be certified by the Court only when the appealed decision (1) determines a substantial issue, (2) establishes a legal right, and (3) meets one or more criteria further enumerated in Rule 42, including that the decision falls under any of the criteria for certification of questions of law set forth in Rule 41. Here, the denial of the motion, if reversed, would result in dismissal of the defendant directors from the suit, so it is a substantial issue. Further, it establishes a legal right in that it necessitates the defendant directors be held as parties to the litigation. Finally, it satisfies the further “conflicting decisions” qualification set forth in Rule 41(b)(ii) because decisions of the Courts of Chancery have been conflicting as to whether, in a transaction subject to entire fairness review at the outset, in which there is a claim for “breach of duty on the part of facially disinterested directors who negotiated …. or otherwise facilitated the transaction needs to be specifically pled” and whether an exculpatory provision must be ignored at the motion to dismiss stage to await consideration of entire fairness at trial. As a result, the Court granted the defendant directors’ application for certification of interlocutory appeal.

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In re Nine Systems Corp. S’Holders Litig., Consol. C.A. No. 3940-VCN (September 4, 2014) (Noble, V.C.)

Sep 23 2014

By Marisa DiLemme

In re Nine Systems Corp. S’Holders Litig. involves the 2002 recapitalization of a two-year-old start-up company, Streaming Media Corporation, later known as Nine Systems Corporation (the “Corporation”). The Corporation was going to have to liquidate unless it could carry out two acquisitions, and the purpose of the 2002 recapitalization was to fund these acquisitions. The recapitalization was approved by four of the directors of the Board of the Corporation, one the CEO of the Corporation and the other three employees of three private equity funds, two of which provided the financing needed for the acquisitions through the recapitalization, and the third of which was given a 90-day option to participate in the recapitalization but did not do so. The fifth director, whose firm had brought in minority stockholders, was not kept informed regarding the recapitalization, which was highly dilutive to the minority stockholders, and never fully approved it. The terms of the recapitalization were proposed by the director whose firm was the largest participant in the recapitalization based on his estimate that the Corporation was worth $4 million, without any independent valuation of the Corporation. After the acquisitions, the Corporation became successful, and it was sold four years later for $175 million.

Zutrau v. Jansing, C.A. No. 7457-VCP (Del. Ch. July 31, 2014) (Parsons, V.C.)

Aug 07 2014

By David Bernstein and Meredith Laitner

On July 31, 2014, the Delaware Chancery Court issued its decision in Zutrau v. Jansing, C.A. No. 7457-VCP (Del. Ch. July 31, 2014) (Parsons, V.C.), requiring the parties to recalculate the payment to which the plaintiff was entitled because her 22% minority interest in a Delaware corporation was squeezed out through a reverse split that reduced her holding to less than one full share. The plaintiff in this case, a former employee of Ice Systems, Inc., brought a derivative suit in which she challenged numerous business decisions made by Ice Systems after her employment terminated and challenged compensation and expense reimbursement payments made to the CEO, who was also the 78% stockholder and the sole director. The plaintiff also (a) asked the Court to set aside the reverse split on the ground that it was made for the improper purpose of depriving her of the ability to bring a derivative suit, or alternatively (b) to increase the sum to which she was entitled as a result of the cancellation of her 22% interest through the reverse split.

The Court did not decide whether the plaintiff no longer had standing to sue derivatively because she was no longer a stockholder when she commenced the suit, because the defendant acknowledged that if Ice Systems would have been entitled to recover sums if the plaintiff had been able to sue derivatively, the corporation’s right to recover those sums would increase the amount to which the plaintiff is entitled because of the cancellation of her stock interest, and therefore, the outcome of her suit would be the same whether or not she was permitted to sue derivatively.

Hamilton Partners, L.P. v. Highland Capital Management, et al., C.A. No. 6547-VCN (May 7, 2014) (Noble, V.C.)

May 09 2014

By David Bernstein

Plaintiff Hamilton Partners, L.P. challenged in the Delaware Chancery Court the fairness of a merger between a Nevada corporation, American HomePatient, Inc. (“New AHP”), a successor to a Delaware corporation of the same name (“AHP”), and Highland Capital Management, L.P. (“Highland”), which before the challenged transactions owned 48% of AHP’s stock and held most of its debt. The initial question was whether the validity of the actions was governed by Nevada law or by Delaware law. The Court said that most of the transactions took place under an agreement that was signed while the corporation was a Delaware corporation and that those transactions would be governed by Delaware law. However, transactions that were not approved by the Board until after the reincorporation in Nevada would be governed by Nevada law.

The Court then addressed whether the fairness of the merger should be determined under the business judgment rule or under the entire fairness test, which would apply if Highland was a controlling stockholder. The Court said that although there were prior Delaware decisions that made it possible that Highland’s 48% ownership interest alone might not have caused it to be viewed as a controlling person when determining whether the Board’s approval of the merger should be evaluated based on the business judgment rule or on the entire fairness test, the combination of Highland’s 48% stock interest and the fact that it had used its creditor position to force the corporation to engage in the series of transactions that was being challenged made it clear that Highland was a controlling person and that the entire fairness test should apply. Therefore, noting that it is almost never possible to dismiss a complaint in an instance in which the entire fairness test applies, the Court refused to dismiss the claim against Highland.

The Plaintiff also sued Joseph Furlong, the CEO and a director of AHP, claiming that he had a personal interest in the merger (he would receive a $6.5 million payment if it took place) and therefore his actions as a director should be evaluated under the entire fairness test. The Court said that because the Board consisted of three directors, and the other two directors, whose independence was not challenged and who were not claimed to have been dominated by Furlong, approved the merger, and their approval was governed by the business judgment rule, it made no difference whether Furlong’s approval was governed by the business judgment rule or was subject to the entire fairness test. The Court also pointed out that because the merger was approved by the Board after the corporation had reincorporated in Nevada, Furlong’s liability would be governed by a Nevada statute that exculpates a director from personal liability unless the director’s act or failure to act constituted a breach of fiduciary duties and the “breach of those duties involved intentional misconduct, fraud or a knowing violation of the law”. The Court found that the Plaintiff had not claimed that Furlong had been guilty of intentional misconduct, fraud or a knowing violation of law, and therefore Furlong was entitled to the protection of the Nevada exculpation statute. Accordingly, it dismissed the claims against Furlong.

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Kahn et. al. v. M&F Worldwide Corp. et. al., No. 334, 2013

Mar 18 2014

By Kristy Harlan and Porter Sesnon

In a much anticipated decision, on March 14, 2014 the Delaware Supreme Court sitting en banc unanimously affirmed then-Chancellor Strine’s decision in In re MFW Shareholders Litigation to dismiss a stockholder lawsuit related to the 2011 acquisition of M&F Worldwide Corp. (“MFW”) by its controlling stockholder, MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. (“Holdings”). In upholding the dismissal, the Delaware Supreme Court confirmed that the business judgment standard of review, rather than an “entire fairness” standard of review, applies to controlling-party buyouts where the transaction is conditioned ab initio upon both: (1) the approval of an independent, adequately-empowered special committee that meets its duty of care and (2) the un-coerced, informed vote of a majority of the minority stockholders.

In May 2011, Holdings, which owned 43.4% of MFW’s common stock, began to explore the possibility of taking MFW private. In June 2011, Holdings delivered a written proposal to purchase the MFW shares not already owned by Holdings for $24 per share in cash, representing a premium to the prior day’s closing price of $16.96. Holdings’ proposal expressly stated that it would be subject to approval by a special committee of MFW’s board made up of independent directors, and included a non-waivable condition that a majority of the minority of stockholders approve the transaction.

Frank v. Elgamal, C.A. No. 6120-VCN (March 10, 2014) (Noble, V.C.)

Mar 14 2014

By Annette Becker and Claire White

In this opinion, Vice Chancellor Noble considered defendants’ motion for summary judgment in connection with various breach of fiduciary duty claims asserted by a former stockholder, Richard Frank, against the Board of Directors and two employees of American Surgical Holdings, Inc. (“ASH”), a public company, in connection with the merger of ASH with an affiliate of Great Point Partners I, L.P. (“GPP”). In connection with the motion the Chancery Court examined:

• the “entire fairness” standard of review;

• the effect of a special committee on the standard of review;

• the standard of review for Revlon claims upon a motion for summary judgment, particularly where the target’s charter includes an exculpatory clause;

• a special committee’s examination of projections underlying a fairness opinion, including where multiple sets of projections are prepared; and

• the interaction between a shareholder’s unjust enrichment and breach of fiduciary duty claims upon a motion for summary judgment.

Catagory:Entire Fairness