Catagory:Derivative Suit

1
Wolst v. Monster Beverage Corporation, C.A. No. 9154-VCP (Del. Ch. October 3, 2014) (Noble, V.C.)
2
In re Jenzabar, Inc. Derivative Litig., Civil Action No. 4521-VCG (July 30, 2014) (Vice Chancellor Glasscock)
3
In re TriQuint Semiconductor, Inc. Stockholders Litigation, C.A. No. 9415-VCN (Del. Ch. June 13, 2014)
4
Crothall, et al. v. Zimmerman, et al., Del. No. 608, 2013 (May 28, 2014)

Wolst v. Monster Beverage Corporation, C.A. No. 9154-VCP (Del. Ch. October 3, 2014) (Noble, V.C.)

By David Bernstein and Meredith Laitner

On October 3, 2014, the Delaware Chancery Court issued its ruling in Wolst v. Monster Beverage Corporation, C.A. No. 9154-VCP (Del. Ch. October 3, 2014) (Noble, V.C.), rejecting the plaintiff’s request to inspect Monster Beverage Corporation’s books and records pursuant to Section 220 of the Delaware General Corporation Law.

The plaintiff’s stated purpose for her request to inspect Monster’s books was to determine whether there was a basis for her to bring a derivative suit against Monster based on insider trading that occurred seven years ago.  A class action regarding the insider trading had been settled for $16.25 million and a prior derivative suit, in which the plaintiff had been a participant, had been dismissed for failure to make a demand on the Board.  Subsequently a demand on the Board had been made and rejected.

The Court held that the possible new derivative suit that was the reason for the plaintiff’s Section 220 demand was time-barred by laches. Further, Vice Chancellor Noble refused to extend to derivative claims the general rule that a class action tolls the statute of limitations for the members of the class pursuing individual direct claims.

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In re Jenzabar, Inc. Derivative Litig., Civil Action No. 4521-VCG (July 30, 2014) (Vice Chancellor Glasscock)

By David Bernstein and Priya Chadha

In In re Jenzabar, Inc. Derivative Litig., Vice Chancellor Sam Glasscock III held that a terminated trust that has not yet distributed to its beneficiaries shares of a corporation, cannot bring a derivative suit on behalf of the corporation. It “can take only those actions related to preserving its assets for purposes of distribution and wind-up, together with those actions for which the trust instrument specifies.”

The Gregory M. Raiff 2000 Trust (the “Trust”) was established in 2000.  The terms of the Trust Instrument held that it was to terminate in 2002 and distribute all of its assets to another trust.  However, the Trust assets, which included shares of Jenzabar, were never actually distributed after the Trust terminated in 2002.  After the trustee filed this derivative action on behalf of the Trust in 2013, Jenzabar filed a motion to dismiss the derivative suit, arguing that the Trust lacked the capacity to sue because it had terminated.  The Plaintiff countered that because the Trust had never distributed its assets, it still had the capacity to bring a derivative suit due to the fact that it still held Jenzabar stock.

Vice Chancellor Glasscock rejected this argument.  He said that Massachusetts law, which governed the Trust, restricted the powers of a trustee of a terminated trust to what’s necessary to “preserve the trust property while winding up the trust and delivering any trust property to the beneficiary.”  He said that post termination, the only litigation in which the Trust could engage was defensive action necessary to preserve its assets, pursuing litigation was not encompassed within the Trust’s limited powers and thus, it lacked the capacity to pursue the derivative action.

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In re TriQuint Semiconductor, Inc. Stockholders Litigation, C.A. No. 9415-VCN (Del. Ch. June 13, 2014)

By William Axtman and Joshua Haft

In In re TriQuint Semiconductor, Inc. Stockholders Litigation, plaintiff stockholders of TriQuint Semiconductor, Inc. (“TriQuint”) moved to expedite their breach of fiduciary duties claims against TriQuint’s board of directors for approving a merger of equals with RF Micro Devices, Inc. (“RFMD”) in which the shares of each company would be exchanged for 50% of the shares of a newly formed entity, Rocky Holding, Inc. (“Rocky Holding”). In this letter opinion, the Delaware Court of Chancery ruled on plaintiffs’ motion for expedited proceedings with regard to plaintiffs’ claims that the TriQuint board (i) engaged in defensive entrenchment tactics, (ii) agreed to preclusive deal protection devices, and (iii) failed to provide all material information to the stockholders in advance of the stockholder vote.

In order to show good cause for expedited proceedings under Delaware law, plaintiffs must articulate “a sufficiently colorable claim” and show “a sufficient possibility” of irreparable injury so as to justify imposing the costs of an expedited preliminary injunction proceeding on the defendants and the public.

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Crothall, et al. v. Zimmerman, et al., Del. No. 608, 2013 (May 28, 2014)

By Eric Feldman and Naomi Ogan

In Crothall, et al. v. Zimmerman, et al., the defendants in a derivative suit sought to reverse the Delaware Court of Chancery’s decision awarding attorneys’ fees to counsel for Robert Zimmerman, the plaintiff in the underlying action. Zimmerman, a common unitholder of Adhezion Biomedical, LLC (“Adhezion”), originally brought a derivative suit against the directors and certain investors of Adhezion, claiming that (i) certain financing transactions involving the sale of Adhezion units were substantively unfair, and (ii) the units issued in those transactions were not properly authorized in accordance with Adhezion’s operating agreement. The Chancery Court’s opinion rejected Zimmerman’s claim of substantive unfairness, but agreed that Adhezion’s operating agreement had been violated because the units issued in the financing transactions had been issued without an amendment approved by a separate vote of the common unitholders.

The Chancery Court, however, awarded only nominal damages for the breach of the operating agreement, and, before a final judgment was entered, Zimmerman decided to sell his Adhezion units and abandon the lawsuit, thus rendering his claims moot.  As a result, the Chancery Court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss Zimmerman’s claims. Nevertheless, Zimmerman’s counsel was allowed to intervene in the case, and was ultimately awarded $300,000 in attorneys’ fees, on the theory that Adhezion had realized a corporate benefit from the Chancery Court’s decision that a vote of the common unitholders was required to authorize additional units under the operating agreement.

The defendants, while unable to appeal the Chancery Court’s ruling directly due to the absence of a final judgment, asked the Delaware Supreme Court to re-consider the merits of the Chancery Court’s  finding that attorneys’ fees were warranted on the basis of a corporate benefit to Adhezion. The Supreme Court reversed the Chancery Court’s ruling, finding that Zimmerman’s counsel had not created a corporate benefit, and therefore was not entitled to the $300,000 in attorneys’ fees originally awarded by the Chancery Court. Without evaluating the Chancery Court’s substantive reading of the Adhezion operating agreement, the Supreme Court held that when a plaintiff takes action to moot his own claim, as Zimmerman did by selling his units and abandoning his claims before entry of a final judgment after trial, no corporate benefit can be created and therefore no attorneys’ fees should be awarded on that basis. The Supreme Court noted that, while attorneys’ fees have previously been awarded on the basis of mooted claims, those claims were rendered moot by the actions of the defendant, not the plaintiff. In contrast, in this case the Supreme Court refused to award fees on the basis of a claim that even the plaintiff himself had chosen not to pursue.

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