By: Scott Waxman and Serena Hamann
In Leonard F. Iacono Sr. et al. v. Estate of Joseph M. Capano et al, C.A. No. 11841-VCL (Del. Ch. June 29, 2020), the Delaware Court of Chancery denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment because the evidence, construed in favor of the Plaintiffs, could support a finding that an enforceable oral agreement to form a joint venture existed between the parties.
Read MoreBy: Scott Waxman and Adam Heyd
In Braga Investment & Advisory, LLC v. Yenni Income Opportunities Fund I, L.P., C.A. No. 2017-0393-AGB (Del. Ch. June 8, 2020), Braga Investment & Advisory, LLC (“Braga”), a minority investor in Steven Feller, P.E., LLC (“Newco”) alleged that Yenni Income Opportunities Fund I, L.P. (the “Fund”), the majority investor in Newco, had breached a purchase agreement for interests in Newco when the Fund amended it without Braga’s consent. Braga also contended that the Fund breached its co-investment agreement with Braga when it revoked Braga’s right to receive board packages under that agreement. The Delaware Court of Chancery (the “Court”) concluded that the Fund’s amendment of the purchase agreement did not require Braga’s consent, and that the Fund did not breach Braga’s right to receive board packages based on the ordinary use of that term.
Read MoreBy: Scott E. Waxman and Marissa Leon
In Bradley E. Julius v. Accurus Aerospace Corporation, C.A. No. 2017-0632-MTZ (Del. Ch. 2019), the Delaware Court of Chancery (the “Court”) granted summary judgment on behalf of a target company dismissing the purchaser’s breach of contract claims in connection with an asset purchase agreement and on behalf of the purchaser dismissing the target company’s breach of contract claims in connection with the asset purchase agreement and related escrow agreement. The Court found that the contracts were unambiguous and the language in the contracts was clear and therefore there were no genuine disputes of material fact to litigate.
Read MoreBy: Remsen Kinne and Alidad Vakili
In Concerned Citizens of the Estates of Fairway Village, et al, v. Fairway Cap, LLC and Fairway Village Construction Inc., C.A. No. 2017-0924-JRS (Del. Ch. March 6, 2019), homeowners resident in Fairway Village, a residential planned community (“Plaintiffs”) claimed that plans and actions taken by one of the community’s developers, defendant Fairway Cap, LLC (“Fairway Cap”), to construct, own and lease townhouse condominiums in the community for use as rental apartments breached contractual provisions of Fairway Village’s governing documents. In its verdict for defendants, the Court of Chancery (the “Court”) rejected those claims, and concluded that Plaintiffs failed to prove a breach of contract and denied Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment.
Read MoreBy: Elisabeth Yandell McNeil, Adrienne Wimberly, and Jeremy Crites
In Germaninvestments AG v. Allomet Corp., C.A. No. 2018-0666-JRS (Del. Ch. May 23, 2019), the Delaware Court of Chancery (the “Court”) granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the action brought to determine the appropriate venue for dispute resolution, finding that the forum selection clause agreed upon by the parties in the agreement that was the subject of the dispute was both mandatory and enforceable, meaning that the action must be brought exclusively in Vienna, Austria.
Read MoreBy: Scott Waxman and Rich Minice
In Coyne v. Fusion Healthworks, LLC Civil Action No. 2018-0011-MTZ (Del. Ch. April 30, 2019), the Delaware Court of Chancery denied a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim (the “Motion”) filed by Fusion Healthworks, LLC (the “LLC”), James Sheehan with his personal medical practice, and Andrew Lietzke, with his personal medical practice (collectively, the “Defendants”). In denying the Motion, the court reiterated the standing principal that, when presented with a contractual ambiguity, dismissal at the motion to dismiss stage is only appropriate “if the defendants’ interpretation [of the ambiguity] is the only reasonable construction as a matter of law.” Coyne highlights the critical nature of competent drafting of LLC Agreements.
Read MoreBy: Scott E. Waxman and Douglas A. Logan
In, In re 11 West Partners, LLC, the Delaware Court of Chancery (the “Court”) refused to reform a contract with clear language, finding the argument of a scrivener’s error unconvincing. While the Court noted that it found all of the parties’ testimony believable, the Court did not find clear and convincing evidence that a mistake was made in drafting the contract in question.
Read MoreBy: Scott Waxman and Samantha Beatty
In Ross v. Institutional Longevity Assets LLC, C.A. No. 2017-0186-TMR (Del. Ch. Feb. 26, 2019), the Chancery Court, in a motion for judgement on the pleadings, found that the plain language of a limited liability company’s operating agreement was sufficient to affirm the notion that the plaintiff had failed to establish a set of facts to support his breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty claims. The Court found that (i) where the language of a contract is clear, the parties’ disagreement will not render a contract ambiguous; (ii) where a plaintiff has not identified gaps in the language of a contract, there can be no evidence that an implied covenant of good faith has been breached, and (iii) where a fiduciary duty claim arises out of the same conduct as a contract claim, the fiduciary claim is superfluous.
Read MoreBy Christopher J. Voss and Michael C. Payant
In Post Holdings, Inc., et al. v. NPE Seller Rep LLC, et al., Chancellor Andre G. Bouchard granted defendant NPE Seller Rep LLC’s (“Seller Representative”) motion for judgment on the pleadings on its counterclaim seeking payment of tax refunds and insurance proceeds allegedly owing under a stock purchase agreement (the “Agreement”). In rendering its decision, the Court concluded that once a party has made a contractual indemnification demand based on a counterparty’s alleged material breach, such party cannot rely on the same breach to excuse non-performance of its own obligations under the contract. The Court also found that unliquidated indemnification claims could not be the basis for an offset of amounts owed in the absence of contract language to the contrary.
By Michelle R. McCreery Repp and Stephanie A. Winkler
In Cedarview Opportunities Master Fund, L.P. v. Spanish Broadcasting System, Inc., CA No. 2017-0785-AGB (Del. Ch. Aug. 27, 2018), the Court of Chancery granted in part and denied in part the motion of Spanish Broadcasting System (“SBS” or the “Company”) to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims, which were based on alleged breaches by the Company of its certificate of incorporation and certificate of designations for its preferred stock, under Court of Chancery Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim and Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of ripeness. In ruling on one aspect of the Company’s motion to dismiss, the Court notably held that the parties should be permitted to admit extrinsic evidence to resolve an ambiguity with respect to the terms governing preferred stock, and in doing so, expressly declined to apply two arguably conflicting principles historically used by Delaware courts in resolving such an ambiguity, the application of which would not necessitate or permit the admission of extrinsic evidence.
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