Chancery Court Rule 12(b)(6) – Page 7

Chancery Court Holds that both Exclusive and Nonexclusive Forum Selection Clauses Can Supplant the McWane First Filed Doctrine

Apr 20 2015

The Chancery Court held that the McWane first filed doctrine does not necessarily require a complaint to be dismissed or stayed in favor of a case pending in another state involving similar claims, parties, and facts, when the claim is based on an agreement including a bargained for, nonexclusive and irrevocable forum selection clause.

On April 15, 2015, the Chancery Court in Utilipath v. Baxter, C.A. No. 9922-VCP (Del. Ch. April 15, 2015) (Parsons, V.C.) denied a Motion to Dismiss a complaint attempting to compel enforcement of an alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) provision in a Redemption Agreement as it pertained to a dispute over closing net working capital. Prior to August, 2013, defendants Baxter McLindon Hayes, Jr., Baxter McLindon Hayes III, and Jarrod Tyson Hayes (the “Hayes Defendants”) were the sole members of defendant Utilipath, LLC (“Old Utilipath,” and together with Hayes Defendants, the “Defendants”), a North Carolina LLC. In August 2013, the Hayes Defendants transferred all of their membership interests in Old Utilipath to defendant Utilipath Holdings, Inc. (“Holdings”), a North Carolina corporation. Subsequently Old Utilipath merged with plaintiff Utilipath, LLC, (“Utilipath”) a Delaware LLC, resulting in Holdings becoming the parent company of Utilipath.

Chancery Court Finds No Fiduciary Duty for Limited Partners

Feb 13 2015

By Scott Waxman and Eric Jay

Chancery Court grants motion to dismiss against former limited partners seeking damages for a freeze-out merger they claimed was a self-dealing transaction by the general partner and its affiliates. The Court granted the motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction with regard to the general partner defendants based on a standard arbitration clause that referenced AAA Rules. The Court also granted the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim with regard to the affiliated limited partner defendants because majority ownership of the merged entities, without more, did not create a fiduciary duty to the plaintiffs.

On February 10, 2015, Vice Chancellor Parsons issued a memorandum opinion in Lewis v. AimCo Properties, L.P., 2015 WL 557995, (Del. Ch. Feb. 10, 2015) granting Motions to Dismiss for each group of defendants in the case. The case was brought by several former holders of limited partnership units (“Plaintiffs”) in four Delaware limited partnerships (the “Partnerships”). Each of the Partnerships was managed by corporate entity general partners (“GP Defendants”) that were each indirectly owned by Apartment Investment and Management Company (“AimCo”). AimCo also indirectly held a majority of the limited partnership units of each Partnership through various affiliates (together with various officers, the “LP Defendants”).

Chancery Court Finds No “Gap” to be Filled, No Implied Covenant Claim in Earn-Out Dispute

Feb 04 2015

By Nick Froio and Lauren Garraux

Chancery Court grants defendant’s motion to dismiss alternative claims of breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, fraudulent inducement and negligent misrepresentation in earn-out dispute, holding that merger agreement set the standard to determine whether non-payment of earn-out was improper.

Fortis Advisors LLC v. Dialog Semiconductor PLC, C.A. No. 9522-CB (January 30, 2015) involves a dispute over whether earn-out payments are owed to the former equityholders of iWatt, Inc. (“iWatt”) pursuant to an Agreement and Plan of Merger dated as of July 1, 2013 (the “Merger Agreement”) whereby Dialog Semiconductor PLC (“Dialog”) acquired iWatt. Under the Merger Agreement, Dialog was to pay earn-out payments of up to $35 million depending on the post-merger revenues of Dialog’s Power Conversion Business Group, of which iWatt became a part post-closing. In addition, the terms of the Merger Agreement required that Dialog use its “commercially reasonable best efforts” to achieve and pay the earn-out payments in full. Revenues, however, fell short of the threshold amount to trigger the earn-out payments.

Fiduciary and Contractual Claims Arising from LLC Management Dispute Survive a Motion to Dismiss

Dec 23 2014

By Scott Waxman and Ryan Drzemiecki

In an ongoing dispute between the members of a Delaware limited liability company, Vice Chancellor Parsons was tasked with resolving pre-trial motions filed by both the managing member defendants and the non-managing member plaintiffs. Except for plaintiffs’ claim of waste, V.C. Parsons denied the defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss finding that, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of plaintiffs, facts have been pleaded that make the defendants’ inappropriate at this stage of the litigation. In addition, V.C. Parsons denied plaintiffs motion of summary judgment, which sought to remove the defendant LLC from its position as managing member, finding that the plaintiffs have not yet produced evidence sufficient to meet their burden of showing that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

This case involves an ongoing dispute between the managing member and non-managing members of Dunes Point West, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company (the “Company”). The Company was formed in 2006 to acquire and operate an apartment complex in in the State of Kansas (the “Apartment Complex”). Presently, Louis Cortese and the 2009 Caiola Family Trust (“Plaintiffs”) collectively hold 90% of the membership interests in the Company. Defendants include the Company’s managing member and holder of 10% of its membership interests, PWA, LLC, a Kansas limited liability company (“PWA”) and Ward Katz, the managing member of PWA.

Higher Education Management Group, Inc. v. Matthews, C.A. No. 911-VCP (November 3, 2014) (Parsons, V.C.)

Nov 06 2014

By David Bernstein and Max Kaplan

On November 3, 2014, the Delaware Chancery Court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss derivative claims in Higher Education Management Group, Inc. v. Mathews, C.A. No. 911-VCP (Del. Ch. Nov. 3, 2014) (Parsons, V.C.), after finding, among other things, that plaintiffs failed to plead with particularity facts showing demand upon nominal defendant’s board would have been futile. In this case, defendant corporation’s subsidiary, Aspen University, paid out nearly $2.2 million in what were apparently expense reimbursements between 2003 and 2011. These outlays were never recorded in the firm’s accounts—a fact discovered by management through a November 2011 audit. Apparently, rather than recording the expense, which would have required Aspen to restate previous years’ financial statements, management chose to treat the $2.2 million as a secured loan receivable owed by Aspen University’s former CEO—plaintiff Patrick Spada—with the intention of taking a write-off in the future. Spada denied there ever was a loan and alleged that defendant officers and directors materially misrepresented the corporation’s finances by knowingly mischaracterizing the $2.2 million as a loan.

The court did not reach the merits of plaintiffs’ accusations, and it instead found that plaintiffs failed to either make a demand on the board or sufficiently plead that such a demand would be futile. Plaintiffs had argued that the director defendants had made knowing misrepresentations that exposed them to a “substantial likelihood” of liability, and therefore all the directors were “interested” for purposes of satisfying the demand futility test. However, Plaintiffs pled events that, if taken as true, showed only that two directors knew that there was no loan. With regard to all the other directors, plaintiffs alleged only general knowledge of the loan being fake, attributing identical actions to all of the directors as a group without making specific allegations with regard to individual directors. According to the court, “such broad and identical assertions . . . do not meet the requirements of pleading facts with particularity.” Having found that the facts pled by the plaintiffs were only sufficient to show that a minority of directors were “interested,” the court concluded that a demand had not been shown to be futile and dismissed the claim.

Higher Education Management Group, Inc. v. Mathews

Mehta v. Smurfit-Stone Container Corp., C.A. No. 6891-VCL (October 20, 2014) (Laster, V.C.)

Oct 27 2014

By Scott Waxman and Caitlin Howe

Pro se plaintiffs, Ram and Neena Mehta (the “Mehtas”), owned common stock of defendant Smurfit-Stone Container Corporation (“Smurfit”), which, after reorganizing in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy, merged with a wholly-owned acquisition subsidiary of Rock-Tenn Company (“Rock-Tenn Sub” and “Rock-Tenn Parent”, respectively). The Mehtas challenged (i) decisions leading to Smurfit’s bankruptcy, (ii) the merger with Rock-Tenn Sub, and (iii) Rock-Tenn Sub’s failure to pay the Mehtas the merger consideration from the Rock-Tenn Sub/Smurfit merger. The defendants moved to dismiss the Mehtas’ claims for failure to state a claim, and Vice Chancellor Laster granted the defendants’ motion with respect to claims (i) and (ii); however, claim (iii) survives, with the caveat that the Mehtas are not entitled to indirect or consequential damages.

On June 21, 2010, Smurfit emerged from a Chapter 11 bankruptcy, having cancelled and re-issued 95% of its stock to its former creditors and the remainder to its shareholders, including the Mehtas who owned 1,486 shares after the reorganization. Less than six months later, Smurfit and Rock-Tenn Parent announced their plans for a merger for cash and Rock-Tenn Parent stock consideration. The Mehtas timely filed a demand for appraisal, and the merger was subsequently consummated. However, the Mehtas eventually withdrew their demand and never filed a petition for appraisal. The Mehtas did not receive any merger consideration.

In Re: Crimson Exploration Inc. Stockholder Litigation, C.A. No. 8541-VCP (October 24, 2014) (Parsons, V.C.)

Oct 26 2014

By William Axtman and Ryan Drzemiecki

In Re: Crimson Exploration Inc. Stockholder Litigation involved a consolidated class action claim made by certain minority stockholders (“Plaintiffs”) of Crimson Exploration, Inc. (“Crimson”) challenging the completed acquisition of Crimson by Contango Oil & Gas Co. (“Contango”). The transaction was structured as a stock-for-stock merger (the “Merger”), with the Crimson stockholders holding approximately 20.3 % of the combined entity following the merger and an exchange ratio representing a 7.7% premium based on the April 29, 2013 trading price of Contango common stock and Crimson common stock. Plaintiffs also alleged that the members of Crimson’s Board of Directors (the “Directors”) and various entities affiliated with the investment management firm Oaktree Capital Management, L.P. (“Oaktree”) breached their respective fiduciary duties by selling Crimson below market value for self-serving reasons. In total, Plaintiffs brought claims against Crimson, the Directors, Oaktree, Contango Acquisition, Inc. (the “Merger Sub”) and Contango (“Defendants”).

A major premise of Plaintiffs’ complaint is that Oaktree controlled Crimson and thereby had fiduciary duties to the minority stockholders of Crimson. Oaktree owned roughly 33.7% of Crimson’s pre-Merger outstanding shares and a significant portion of Crimson’s $175 million Second Lien Credit Agreement, which Contango agreed to payoff after the signing of the Merger, including a 1% prepayment fee (the “Prepayment”). Also, in connection with the Merger, Oaktree negotiated to receive a Registration Rights Agreement (the “RRA”) so that it had the option to sell its stock in the post-Merger combined entity through a private placement.

Black Horse Capital, LP, et al. v. Xstelos Holdings, Inc., et al., C.A. No. 8642-VCP (September 30, 2014) (Parsons, V.C.)

Oct 08 2014

By David Edgar and Joshua Haft

In Black Horse Capital, LP, et al. v. Xstelos Holdings, Inc., et al., the plaintiffs, including Cheval Holdings, Ltd. (“Cheval Holdings”), Black Horse Capital, LP, Black Horse Capital Master Fund Ltd. (together with Black Horse Capital, LP, “Black Horse”), and Ouray Holdings I AG, filed a breach of contract action arising out of a transaction in which the plaintiffs and defendants, Jonathan M. Couchman, Xstelos Holdings, Inc., and Xstelos Corp. (formerly known as Footstar Inc. and Footstar Corp. (“Footstar”)) jointly acquired a pharmaceuticals company, CPEX Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“CPEX”), which is now wholly owned by defendant FCB I Holdings, Inc. (“FCB Holdings”), an entity jointly owned by Footstar and Cheval Holdings. Immediately following the closing of the acquisition, FCB Holdings was owned 80.5% by Footstar and 19.5% by Cheval Holdings.

The plaintiffs’ claims arose out of an alleged oral promise in December 2010 by the defendants to transfer to the plaintiffs certain assets of CPEX, specifically an additional 60% ownership interest in the drug product known as SER-120 and referred to as “Serenity” by the court. The transfer was to occur after the closing of the CPEX acquisition in exchange for the plaintiffs funding a disproportionately large bridge loan to FCB Holdings (the “Serenity Agreement”). On January 3, 2011, each of Black Horse and Footstar entered into separate bridge loan commitment letters with FCB Holdings and CPEX in the amounts of $10 million and $3 million, respectively. In April 2011, the bridge loans were made to FCB Holdings and the CPEX acquisition closed. In connection with the CPEX acquisition, the bridge loans, and the other related transactions, the parties entered into customary transaction documents. Although the alleged oral promise of the Serenity Agreement was made prior to the parties entering into the transaction documents, none of the transaction documents executed in connection with the loan or the merger referenced the Serenity Agreement. Furthermore, the transaction documents also contained customary integration clauses. By December 2012, the transfer of assets contemplated by the Serenity Agreement had not occurred and relations between the parties deteriorated to the point where the plaintiffs filed this action in June 2013.

Quadrant Structured Products Company v. Vertin, C.A. No. 6990-VCL (October 1, 2014) (Laster, V.C.)

Oct 06 2014

By William Axtman and Dotun Obadina

In Quadrant Structured Products Company v. Vertin, creditor plaintiff Quadrant Structured Products Company, Ltd. (“Quadrant”) asserted breach of fiduciary duty claims derivatively against the Board of Directors (the “Board”) of the Athilon Capital Corp. (the “Company”) and EBF & Associates (“EBF”), the holder of all of equity and certain junior debt of the Company. EBF also managed the operations of the Company through service and license agreements between the Company and an affiliate of EBF, Athilon Structured Investment Advisors, LLC (“ASIA”), and appointed all five directors of the Board, three of which are current employees of EBF.

Quadrant, as holder of senior notes of the Company, asserted that (a) the Company was insolvent and (b) the directors of the Board and EBF breached their fiduciary duty of loyalty and committed corporate waste by (i) continuing to unnecessarily make interest payments on the junior debt, even though such payments could be deferred for an extended period of time (past the likely date of dissolution and liquidation of the Company), (ii) paying excessive service and license fees to ASIA and EBF to operate the Company, and (iii) changing the Company’s business model to take on greater risk under a strategy where EBF would benefit from any upside as the sole holder of the junior debt and the Company’s equity, but the Company’s more senior creditors (including Quadrant) would bear the cost of any downside. In addition, Quadrant asserted claims under the Delaware Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act based on the non-deferral of interest on the junior debt and the payment of excessive service and license fees to ASIA and EBF to operate the Company.

Pontone v. Milso, C.A. No. 8842-VCP (August 22, 2014) (Parsons, V.C.)

Sep 03 2014

By Jamie Bruce and Mark Hammes

This case involves a claim for advancement of legal fees by plaintiff Scott Pontone (“Pontone”), a director and officer of two Delaware corporations, based on indemnification and expense advancement provisions of the corporations’ bylaws. Faced with both a motion to dismiss for lack of standing and Pontone’s motion for summary judgment, the Court granted in part and denied in part the motion to dismiss, and granted partial summary judgment in Pontone’s favor with respect to advancement of certain legal fees and expenses. The Court also found that Pontone was entitled to advancement as to 75% of his “fees on fees” in prosecuting this action.

Pontone was the Vice President of Old Milso, a New York regional casket manufacturer, when it was acquired by The York Group, Inc. (“York”) in 2005. After the acquisition, Pontone served as a director and Executive Vice President of Both York and the successor entity Milso Industries Corporation (“New Milso”) until 2007. In May 2010, Pontone entered into a consulting arrangement with a competitor, Batesville Casket Company (“Batesville”). In August 2010, York and New Milso instituted an action in a federal court in Pennsylvania (the “Underlying Action”) against Pontone and Batesville alleging that they engaged in a wrongful scheme to induce several employees and many of their most lucrative customers to switch to Batesville. The Underlying Action is still ongoing.

Catagory:Chancery Court Rule 12(b)(6)