Bad Faith – Delaware Docket

stockholder bears burden of proving breach of redemption obligation; directors used best judgment to retain sufficient resources of the company

Nov 01 2021

In Continental Investors Fund, LLC v. TradingScreen, Inc., et al, C.A. No. 10164-VCL (Del. Ch. July 23, 2021), the Delaware Court of Chancery (“Court”) denied plaintiff’s claim for breach of contract, holding that Continental Investors Fund, LLC (“Continental”) failed to carry its burden of proving that TradingScreen, Inc. (“Company”) “acted in bad faith, relied on unreliable methods or data, or reached conclusions so off the mark as to constitute constructive fraud” when calculating the redemption value of Continental’s preferred stock. Further, the Court limited the interest due calculation to the date on which funds were legally available.

MANAGEMENT CANNOT UNILATERALLY PRECLUDE DIRECTORS FROM OBTAINING PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS

Jan 20 2021

By: Rich Minice and Annette Becker

In In re WeWork Litigation, C.A. No. 2020-0258-AGB (Del. Ch. Aug. 21, 2020), a special committee of the board of directors of The We Company (the “Company”) sought to obtain certain privileged communication among management of the Company and its counsel in discovery arising from breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty case. The Court held that management of a Delaware corporation (“Management”) does not have the authority to unilaterally preclude a director of the corporation from obtaining the corporation’s privileged information, an issue of first impression in the State of Delaware.

Chancery Court Looks Past “Sham” Paper Trail to Determine Ownership of Holding Company for Argentina Media Conglomerate

Aug 19 2020

By: Scott E. Waxman and Michael C. Payant

In Carlos Eduardo Lorefice Lynch, et al. v. R Angel Gonzalez Gonzalez, et al., C.A. No. 2019-0356-MTZ (Del. Ch. July 31, 2020), the Delaware Court of Chancery (the “Court”) examined an extensive paper trail purportedly documenting the transfer of majority beneficial ownership in an Argentinian company from a media mogul to his attorney, before holding that the media mogul should nevertheless be deemed the owner of the interest in question, because the documents (i) did not constitute a binding contract for the purported transfer to the attorney, (ii) were fraudulently induced by the attorney, and (iii) were the product of unclean hands such that it would be unjust to grant ownership to the attorney.

Request for Attorneys’ Fees Denied Under Corporate Benefit Doctrine

Mar 16 2020

By: Annette Becker and Zack Sager

In Martin v. Harbor Diversified, Inc., the Delaware Court of Chancery denied the plaintiff’s request for attorneys’ fees under the corporate benefit doctrine because the corporate benefit produced by the litigation was “a mere externality” to the plaintiff’s ultimate, personal goal of achieving a buyout of his interest in the corporation.

Undisclosed Post-Merger Compensation Plan for CEO Also Serving as Lead Merger Negotiator Found Insufficient to Rebut Business Judgment Rule and Insufficient to Show Board Acted in Bad Faith

Feb 20 2020

By: Scott E. Waxman and Serena M. Hamann

In the class action, In re Towers Watson & Co. Stockholders Litigation, C.A. no. 2018-0132-KSJM (Del. Ch. July 25, 2019), the Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed the complaint in its entirety under Rule 12(b)(6) because the Plaintiffs failed to plead facts sufficient to rebut the application of the business judgment rule and failed to show the Towers Board acted in bad faith.

CHANCERY COURT APPLIES AND AFFIRMS DELAWARE’S CORPORATE OPPORTUNITY DOCTRINE

Jun 19 2019

By Annette Becker and Frank Mazzucco

In Personal Touch Holding Corp. v. Felix Glaubach, C.A. No. 11199-CB (Del. Ch. February 25, 2019), the Delaware Court of Chancery (the “Court”) found that, by personally pursuing and closing a real estate acquisition in which his employer was also interested, a corporate officer and director had, under Delaware’s corporate opportunity doctrine, breached his fiduciary duty of loyalty.

Stockholder’s Suit for Directors’ Fiduciary Breach Related to Acquisitions and Stock Repurchases Dismissed With Prejudice for Failure to Plead Demand Futility and to State Viable Claims, Directors Found to be Disinterested Regardless of 10-Q Filing Stating Action Without Merit

Nov 30 2018

By: Remsen Kinne and Adrienne Wimberly

In Tilden v. Cunningham et. al., C.A. No. 2017-0837-JRS (Del. Ch. Oct. 26, 2018), the Delaware Court of Chancery granted the motion of directors of Delaware corporation Blucora, Inc. (“Blucora”) named as Defendants to dismiss a derivative action and dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice, holding that the Plaintiff, a Blucora stockholder, failed to plead demand futility and failed to state viable claims under Rule 12(b)(6). This derivative action stems from three transactions Blucora entered into between 2013 and 2015: 1) an acquisition of Monoprice, Inc. (“Monoprice”), 2) the acquisition of HD Vest (“HD Vest”), and 3) several stock repurchases.

CHANCERY COURT FINDS THAT LANGUAGE OF LIMITED PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT GOVERNS WHICH CLAIMS SURVIVE SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN MASTER LIMITED PARTNERSHIP’S RELATED PARTY TRANSACTION

Oct 17 2018

By Scott Waxman and Adrienne Wimberly

In Mesirov v. Enbridge Company, Inc., et al. C.A. No. 11314-VCS (Del. Ch. Aug.29, 2018), the Delaware Chancery Court dismissed five of eight counts alleged with respect to a transaction where Enbridge Energy Company (EEP) repurchased for $1 billion a two-thirds interest in Alberta Clipper Pipelines (AC interest), despite the fact that EEP had sold that same interest years prior for $800 million and the business had steadily declined since such sale. The dismissals were based primarily upon the language and obligations included in EEP’s limited partnership agreement.

Court of Chancery Dismisses Derivative Suit for Failure to Demonstrate Demand Futility because Plaintiff Failed to Allege Particularized Facts

Jul 19 2018

By: Charles Carter and Caitlin Velasco

In Steinberg on behalf of Hortonworks, Inc. v. Bearden, C.A. No. 2017-0286-AGB (Del. Ch. May 30, 2018), the Delaware Court of Chancery granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the stockholder plaintiff’s derivative claims for breach of fiduciary duties under Court of Chancery Rule 23.1, because the plaintiff failed to make a pre-suit demand or demonstrate that doing so would be futile. The Court found that the plaintiff failed to plead particularized facts sufficient to raise reasonable doubt that a majority of the directors on the Hortonworks, Inc. board could have exercised their independent and disinterested business judgment in responding to a pre-suit demand. Read More

Chancery Court Awards Damages for Breach of Fiduciary Duty Stemming from Director’s Refusal to Sign Self-Help Documents

Jul 16 2018

By: C.J. Voss and Rich Minice

In CertiSign Holding, Inc. v. Sergio Kulikovsky, C.A. No. 12055-VCS, the Court found that Sergio Kulikovsky (“Kulikovsky”), a former director of CertiSign Holding, Inc. (“CertiSign”), had breached his fiduciary duty of loyalty to CertiSign by actively sabotaging corporate self-help efforts in a bid to advance his own personal objectives. The Court also denied Kulikovsky’s counterclaims for judicial validation of certain stock option grants and the assumption by CertiSign of a debt owed to Kulikovsky, and awarded Certisign damages in the amount of $390,455.20 for the “legal fees and expenses incurred by CertiSign in connection with its efforts to remedy its defective capitalization and board issues.”

Catagory:Bad Faith