chadha – Delaware Docket

Chancery Court Rules that LLC Unit Buyout Provision Operated As a Call Option

May 26 2020

In Kieran Walsh et al. v. White House Post Productions, LLC, et al., C.A. No. 2019-0419-KSJM (March 25, 2020), Plaintiffs Kieran Walsh and Francis Devlin brought claims for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and specific performance following a dispute with Defendant Carbon Visual Effects, LLC (the “Company”) regarding a buyout provision in the Company’s LLC Agreement. On a motion to dismiss, Vice Chancellor McCormick held that the buyout provision operated as a call option, requiring Defendants to purchase Plaintiffs’ LLC units once it exercised its option by noticing its intent to purchase them.

Chancery Court Enforces LLC Agreement, Further Demonstrating that LLCs are Creatures of Contract

Sep 06 2018

By Scott E. Waxman and Priya Chadha

In A&J Capital, Inc. v. Law Office of Krug, C.A. No. 2018-0240-JRS (July 18, 2018), A&J Capital, Inc. (“A&J”) sought a declaratory judgment that it was improperly removed from its position as manager of LA Metropolis Condo, I LLC (the “Company”) because it was not given notice or an opportunity to be heard prior to removal. Vice Chancellor Slights denied A&J’s motion for summary judgment, holding that A&J’s removal was proper under both the Company’s governing documents and common law.

Chancery Court Denies In Part Motion to Dismiss Breach of Contract and Breach of Fiduciary Duties Claims

Jun 14 2018

By Shoshannah Katz and Priya Chadha

In Feldman v. Soon-Shiong, et al. (C.A No. 2017-0487-AGB), the Delaware Court of Chancery denied in part and granted in part a motion to dismiss claims involving, among other things, breach of contract and breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty, following a defendant’s withdrawal of $47 million from a company bank account.

Chancery Court Holds That Certificate of Incorporation Provision Provides Preferred Stockholders Voting Right, Not Entitlement to Liquidation Preference

Jul 11 2017

By Holly Hatfield and Priya Chadha

In In re Appraisal of GoodCents Holdings, Inc., C.A. No. 11723-VCMR, Vice-Chancellor Montgomery-Reeves held that, following a merger, a provision in the target company’s certificate of incorporation only provided preferred stockholders a voting right, not an entitlement to a liquidation preference.

Innocence Lost: The Rebuttable Presumption Of Stock Ownership

Sep 16 2016

By Joanna Diakos Kordalis and Priya Chadha

In Pogue v. Hybrid Energy, Inc., C.A. No. 11563-VCG (Aug. 5, 2016), the Court of Chancery held that inclusion of a party (in this case the plaintiff) in a stock record provides a prima facie but rebuttable case that such party is a stockholder of record for purposes of seeking books and records under DGCL Section 220. In Pogue, the Court held that the defendant had successfully rebutted the presumption that plaintiff was a stockholder by clear and convincing evidence and therefore the Court denied the plaintiff the relief sought and granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgement.

Chancery Court Enforces Good Faith Standard of Care in Limited Partnership Agreement

By Eric Feldman and Priya Chadha

In Brinckerhoff v. Enbridge Energy Co., Inc., et al., C.A. No. 11314-VCS (April 29, 2016), the Delaware Court of Chancery reiterated its adherence to the principle stated in the Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act (“DRULPA”) of giving “maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract and to the enforceability of partnership agreements” as well as to the ability under DRULPA of parties to a limited partnership agreement to define their respective standards of care and scope of duties and liabilities, including to eliminate default fiduciary duties, and dismissed the plaintiff’s claims.

In re Sanchez Energy Derivative Litig., C.A. No. 9132-VCG (November 25, 2014) (Glasscock, V.C.)

Dec 03 2014

By Priya Chadha and David Bernstein

In In re Sanchez Energy, Vice Chancellor Glasscock granted a motion to dismiss in a shareholder derivative action because the plaintiffs had failed to make a demand on the Board, holding that the plaintiffs failed to meet Rule 23.1’s particularized pleading standards for demand futility. The case centered around a transaction in which Sanchez Energy Corporation (“Sanchez Energy”), a publicly held corporation, purchased property at $2500/acre from Sanchez Resources, LLC (“Sanchez Resources”), a privately held, company, which Sanchez Resources had purchased for $184/acre. Two members of the Sanchez family—A.R. Sanchez Jr. and A.R. Sanchez III—owned a combined 21.5% of the shares of Sanchez Energy and served on its board of directors, which had three other members. Those three members comprised Sanchez Energy’s audit committee, which approved the transaction.

The court rejected the plaintiff’s claim that demand would have been futile because the three members of the Audit Committee were not independent. The Vice Chancellor said the plaintiffs had failed to show the audit committee members’ social and business relationships with the Sanchezes were such that “the non-interested director would be more willing to risk his or her reputation than risk the relationship with the interested director.” He also rejected Plaintiffs’ arguments that the Sanchezes should be treated as controlling shareholders because they failed to show that the Sanchezes controlled the board or the negotiation process for the transaction. Vice Chancellor Glasscock pointed to the fact that transaction was approved by the Audit Committee and that the Sanchezes owned at most a combined 21.5% stake in Sanchez Energy as evidence that the Sanchezes were not controlling shareholders. Lastly, VC Glasscock rejected the idea that because of the huge disparity between what Sanchez Resources paid to acquire the property and what Sanchez Energy paid to acquire the property from Sanchez Resources, the transaction was so facially unfair that it could not have been the product of valid business judgment, noting, among other things, that between Sanchez Resources’ initial purchase and its sale to Sanchez Energy, half of the property had been developed and found to contain proven oil reserves.

Thus, because the Complaint failed to specifically please facts excusing demand, the Court dismissed the Complaint.

In Re Sanchez

Author:chadha