Archive:March 2021

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Interpretation of an LLC Agreement with Respect to the Appointment and Removal of Board Members Is Strictly Based on the Plain Language Contained in the Four Corners of the LLC Agreement
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Chancery Court Holds that Subsidiary must Advance Legal Fees to Parent Company to Cover Costs from Separate Suit by Subsidiary Against Parent Company
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CEO’s Role in Preparation of a Proxy Statement for a Merger Exposes CEO to Duty of Care Claims
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DELAWARE COURT OF CHANCERY DENIES MOTIONS TO DISMISS CLAIMS ALLEGING BREACH OF CONTRACT
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WHAT’S SELECTED TO HAPPEN IN VEGAS, STAYS IN VEGAS: CHANCERY COURT ENFORCES FORUM SELECTION CLAUSE IN RE-DOMESTICATED NEVADA CORPORATION BYLAWS, DESPITE ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OCCURRING WHILE ENTITY WAS A DELAWARE CORPORATION

Interpretation of an LLC Agreement with Respect to the Appointment and Removal of Board Members Is Strictly Based on the Plain Language Contained in the Four Corners of the LLC Agreement

By Scott E. Waxman and Jennifer J. Yeung

Where one fifty-percent owner of a single member LLC wished to remove the existing tiebreaker director, the Delaware Court of Chancery held that he could not do so.  A governing LLC agreement’s plain language must be strictly construed; and in this case, it did not provide for unilateral removal of a board member.

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Chancery Court Holds that Subsidiary must Advance Legal Fees to Parent Company to Cover Costs from Separate Suit by Subsidiary Against Parent Company

By Scott E. Waxman and Mick G. Pence

In International Rail Partners, LLC v. American Rail Partners, LLC, C.A. No. 2020-0177-PAF (Del. Ch. November 24, 2020) plaintiffs International Rail Partners LLC, Boca Equity Partners LLC, Patriot Equity LLC, and Marino (“Plaintiffs”) and defendant American Rail Partners LLC. (“Company”) both filed motions for judgment on the pleadings. The Delaware Court of Chancery (“Court”) granted the Plaintiffs’ motion that sought advancement of expenses incurred while defending an action filed against them by the Company in the Delaware Superior Court. The Court held that the parties’ Limited Liability Company Agreement (“LLC Agreement”) unambiguously provided that the Company must advance the Plaintiffs’ fees incurred in defending the Superior Court action.

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CEO’s Role in Preparation of a Proxy Statement for a Merger Exposes CEO to Duty of Care Claims

By Lisa Stark and Jonathan Shallow 

In In Re Baker Hughes Inc. Merger Litig., C.A. No. 2019-0638-AGB (Del. Ch. Oct. 27, 2020), the Delaware Court of Chancery declined to dismiss claims that the CEO of Baker Hughes Incorporated (“Baker Hughes”) breached his fiduciary duty of care by failing to include unaudited financial statements of the oil and gas segment of the General Electric Company (“GE O&G”) in a proxy statement soliciting the stockholder vote on Baker Hughes merger with GE O&G.  As a result, the Court found that (1) the stockholder vote was uninformed, and (2) enhanced scrutiny under Revlon, Inc. v. McAndrews & Forbes Hldgs., Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). (“Revlon”), not the business judgment review under Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings LLC (125 A.3d 304, 306 (Del. 2015)), applied to its decision whether plaintiffs had adequately pled a predicate breach of fiduciary duty by the Baker Hughes board for purposes of an aiding and abetting claim asserted against General Electric Company (“GE”).  At the time of its decision, none of the Baker Hughes directors were named as defendants in the action except for Baker Hughes’ CEO who was named as a defendant in the action solely in his capacity as an officer of Baker Hughes.

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DELAWARE COURT OF CHANCERY DENIES MOTIONS TO DISMISS CLAIMS ALLEGING BREACH OF CONTRACT

By Whitney J. Smith and Mehreen Ahmed

In Re WeWork Litigation, C.A. No. 2020-0258-AGB (Del. Ch. Oct. 30, 2020), concerns a transformative transaction involving The We Company, a real estate company specializing in shared workspaces more commonly known as WeWork. Adam Neumann (“Neumann”), the CEO of WeWork, brought a case against both SoftBank Group (“SBG”) and SoftBank Vision Fund (AIV MI) L.P. (“Vision Fund”) for two counts of breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty as controlling stockholders. SBG and Vision Fund filed partial motions to dismiss the complaint. Vision Fund, but not SBG, sought to dismiss the contract claim against it, whereas, both SBG and Vision Fund sought to dismiss the fiduciary duty claim. In a memorandum opinion, the Delaware Court of Chancery denied Vision Fund’s motion to dismiss the contract claim, except as to one provision, and granted the motion to dismiss the fiduciary duty claim as that claim was duplicative of the contract claims against them.

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WHAT’S SELECTED TO HAPPEN IN VEGAS, STAYS IN VEGAS: CHANCERY COURT ENFORCES FORUM SELECTION CLAUSE IN RE-DOMESTICATED NEVADA CORPORATION BYLAWS, DESPITE ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OCCURRING WHILE ENTITY WAS A DELAWARE CORPORATION

By David L. Forney and Lauren McFadden

In Sylebra Capital Partners Master Fund, Ltd., and P Sylebra Ltd. v. Ronald O. Perelman et al., C.A. No. 2019-0843-JRS (Del. Ch. October 9, 2020), Sylebra Capital Partners Master Fund, Limited and P Sylebra Ltd. (together, “Plaintiff”), had sued Scientific Games, a Nevada corporation (“Company”), and its controlling stockholder and members of its Board (“Defendants”) for breaches of fiduciary duty and violations of the Delaware General Corporation Law (“DGCL”). The Company’s Nevada bylaws, however, contained a provision requiring stockholders to bring claims for breach of fiduciary duty in the courts of Clark County, Nevada. The Delaware Court of Chancery (the “Court”) granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss and held that Plaintiff’s claims were subject to the forum selection provision in the bylaws of the Company and must be brought in Nevada courts.

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