Archive:2015

1
Court of Chancery Applies New DGCL § 205 to Determine Validity of Defective Corporate Acts
2
It’s a Family Affair… but Not Any More, as Chancery Court Grants Motion to Dissolve General Partners Under Section 273 of the DGCL
3
Chancery Court Finds No “Gap” to be Filled, No Implied Covenant Claim in Earn-Out Dispute
4
Chancery Court Holds Merger Agreement’s Forum Selection Clause Trumps Stockholders Agreement
5
Chancery Court Finds that Deal Price Represents Fair Value of Shares in Appraisal Proceeding
6
Differential Voting Rights for Directors of a Delaware Corporation Must Be Set Forth in the Certificate of Incorporation
7
Chancery Court Denies Motion to Expedite on Speculative Disclosure Claims
8
Chancery Court Confirms Standing of Record Holder as of Appraisal Demand Date to Pursue Appraisal
9
DGCL §220 Does Not Limit Court’s Ability to Restrict Shareholder Inspection Rights
10
Chancery Court Confirms Beneficial Owner’s Standing to Pursue Appraisal Action

Court of Chancery Applies New DGCL § 205 to Determine Validity of Defective Corporate Acts

By Eric Freedman and Sophia Lee Shin

In In Re Numoda Corporation Shareholders Litigation, the Court of Chancery exercised its new powers under Delaware General Corporation Law (“DGCL”) § 205, which became effective as of April 1, 2014, to resolve various disputes regarding the capital structures of two related corporations that consistently failed to follow corporate formalities.

In In Re Numoda Corporation Shareholders Litigation, C.A. No. 9163-VCN (Del. Ch. January 30, 2015) (Noble, V.C.) (the “Numoda Shareholders Litigation Decision”), the Delaware Court of Chancery addressed a dispute concerning the capital structures of two corporations, Numoda Corporation (“Numoda Corp.”) and Numoda Technologies, Inc. (“Numoda Tech.”).  The Numoda Shareholders Litigation Decision came on the heels of a decision of the Court of Chancery in a prior related action, Bons v. Schaheen, 2013 WL 6331287 (Del. Ch. Dec. 2, 2013) (the “225 Action”), in which the Court of Chancery refused to recognize several purported stock issuances due to a failure to comply with corporate formalities.  Because DGCL § 204 (Ratification of defective corporate acts and stock) and DGCL § 205 (Proceedings regarding validity of defective corporate acts and stock) became effective on April 1, 2014, after the decision in the 225 Action, the Court in the Numoda Shareholders Litigation Decision used its new statutory powers to untangle the capital structures that had been the subject of the 225 Action.

Read More

It’s a Family Affair… but Not Any More, as Chancery Court Grants Motion to Dissolve General Partners Under Section 273 of the DGCL

By Annette Becker and Lauren Garraux

The Chancery Court granted a petition in accordance with Section 273 of the Delaware General Corporation Law to dissolve two Delaware corporations, the general partners of two Massachusetts limited partnerships, initially formed by the patriarchs of the Grossman and Cohen families to own three real estate properties for the benefit of their respective family members, after the families reached an impasse as to how to dispose of the assets of the business.

In 1992, the patriarchs of the Grossman and Cohen families formed two Massachusetts limited partnerships (the “Partnerships”) to own three real estate properties for the benefit of their family members (at the time of this dispute, 25 Grossmans and 6 Cohens), who are limited partners in the Partnerships.  The general partners of the Partnerships (the “General Partners”) are two Delaware corporations, each of which is a joint venture corporation with two 50% stockholders, at the time of the dispute, the petitioner, Louis Grossman (“Louis”), and the respondent, Claire Cohen (“Claire”).

Read More

Chancery Court Finds No “Gap” to be Filled, No Implied Covenant Claim in Earn-Out Dispute

By Nick Froio and Lauren Garraux

Chancery Court grants defendant’s motion to dismiss alternative claims of breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, fraudulent inducement and negligent misrepresentation in earn-out dispute, holding that merger agreement set the standard to determine whether non-payment of earn-out was improper.

Fortis Advisors LLC v. Dialog Semiconductor PLC, C.A. No. 9522-CB (January 30, 2015) involves a dispute over whether earn-out payments are owed to the former equityholders of iWatt, Inc. (“iWatt”) pursuant to an Agreement and Plan of Merger dated as of July 1, 2013 (the “Merger Agreement”) whereby Dialog Semiconductor PLC (“Dialog”) acquired iWatt. Under the Merger Agreement, Dialog was to pay earn-out payments of up to $35 million depending on the post-merger revenues of Dialog’s Power Conversion Business Group, of which iWatt became a part post-closing. In addition, the terms of the Merger Agreement required that Dialog use its “commercially reasonable best efforts” to achieve and pay the earn-out payments in full. Revenues, however, fell short of the threshold amount to trigger the earn-out payments.

Read More

Chancery Court Holds Merger Agreement’s Forum Selection Clause Trumps Stockholders Agreement

By Jamie Bruce and Mark Hammes

Chancery Court finds that three individual stockholders, as beneficiaries of a merger agreement, were equitably estopped from challenging the valid forum selection clause contained therein despite the fact that they did not personally sign the merger agreement.

In McWane, Inc. v. Lanier, C.A. No. 9488-VCP (Del. Ch. January 30, 2015) (Parsons, V.C.), the Chancery Court denied a motion to dismiss or stay from three individual defendant stockholders who argued that the Court lacked personal jurisdiction over them in a dispute regarding whether certain representations and warranties in a merger agreement were violated.  The court determined that a forum selection clause in a stockholders agreement they had personally signed was trumped by the forum selection clause in the merger agreement that they had not personally signed.  The court determined that not only was the clause in the stockholders agreement merely permissive compared to the merger agreement’s mandatory language, but also that the stockholders agreement fundamentally related to the merger agreement, and the defendants, as beneficiaries of the merger agreement, were equitably estopped from challenging the forum selection clause in the merger agreement.

Read More

Chancery Court Finds that Deal Price Represents Fair Value of Shares in Appraisal Proceeding

By David Bernstein and Meredith Laitner

In response to demands for appraisal of Ancestry.com shares, the Chancery Court found that the agreed upon merger price, which was greater than the price determined by the Court’s discounted cash flow analysis, represented the fair value of the shares.

On January 30, 2015, the Delaware Chancery Court in In re: Appraisal of Ancestry.com, Inc., C.A. No. 8173-VCG (Del. Ch. January 30, 2015) (Glasscock, V.C.) issued its determination as to the fair value of shares held by petitioners at the time of Ancestry’s acquisition by Permira Advisors.  Ancestry stockholders received merger consideration of $32 per share; petitioners in this case sought appraisal under Section 262 of the Delaware General Corporation Law.

In an appraisal proceeding, because neither the petitioner nor the respondent has a burden of proof, the burden falls on the Court to establish fair value. The Court said that the statute requires it to consider all relevant factors, and while the agreed upon price is one of the relevant factors, the Court must go beyond that.

With respect to sale itself, the Court found Ancestry’s auction process sufficiently robust to make the price it generated a reliable and relatively untainted indicator of value.  However, it also made its own discounted cash flow analysis, after dissecting discounted cash flow analyses presented by petitioners’ and Ancestry’s experts, whose valuations differed significantly.  Among other things, Vice Chancellor Glasscock found the experts’ analyses problematic because they were based on projections prepared by Ancestry’s management for the purpose of selling the company and for the purpose of making it possible to obtain a fairness opinion with regard to the price a buyer was likely to pay.  In the end, Vice Chancellor Glasscock came up with a discounted cash value that was slightly below the agreed upon merger price.  He then ruled that the sale price (i.e., the merger price) best represented the fair value, and said his discounted cash value analysis gave him comfort that no undetected factor skewed the sale process.  It is noteworthy that if the Vice Chancellor had determined that the value of the Ancestry shares was the value yielded by his discounted cash flow analysis, the petitioners would have received less than the price paid in the merger.

In re Appraisal of Ancestry.com, Inc., C.A. No. 8173-VCG (Del. Ch. January 30, 2015)(Glasscock, V.C.)

Differential Voting Rights for Directors of a Delaware Corporation Must Be Set Forth in the Certificate of Incorporation

By William Axtman and Dotun Obadina

In addressing a request for a preliminary injunction seeking the invalidity of a resolution adopted by the defendant directors through the exercise of disproportionate voting rights, the Delaware court reaffirmed that differential voting rights for directors of a Delaware corporation must be set forth in the certificate of incorporation.

In Sinchareonkul v. Fahnemann, the plaintiff, a director of Sempermed USA, Inc. (the “Company”), brought suit against two other directors of the Company, seeking declaratory judgments invalidating bylaw provisions that conferred disproportionate voting power on the defendants who are also directors of the Company.  Semperit Technische Produkte Gesellschaft m. b. H. (“Semperit”), Sri Trang Agro-Industry Public Co., Ltd. (“Sri Trang”), and Siam Sempermed Corporation Ltd. (“Siam Sempermed”) agreed to form the Company in 1998 for the purposes of manufacturing latex surgical gloves and then distributing and selling them in the United States market.

Read More

Chancery Court Denies Motion to Expedite on Speculative Disclosure Claims

By Annette Becker and Eric Jay

On January 12, 2015, Vice Chancellor Glasscock issued an opinion in Parsons v. Digital River, Inc., et al., 2015 WL 139760 (Del. Ch. 2015) on a Motion to Expedite brought by Amy Parsons on behalf of similarly situated public stockholders (“Plaintiff”) as to disclosure claims concerning an imminent merger. The ruling on the disclosure claims was deferred after the Vice Chancellor denied Plaintiff’s Motion on December 31, 2014 as it related to Revlon claims raised, in order to allow Plaintiff to submit a supplemental brief clarifying why such claims would be material to stockholders.

The Motion was brought by Plaintiff against the Board of Directors of Digital River, Inc. (the “Company”) for breaches of fiduciary duties arising in connection with the Agreement and Plan of Merger entered into with Siris Capital Group, LLC, dated October 23, 2014 (the “Merger Agreement”). On November 18, 2014, Plaintiff initiated a class action to enjoin the proposed merger on the grounds that the Company was undervalued and that the Board of Directors failed to provide the stockholders with material information regarding the deal process.

Of the numerous disclosure claims raised by Plaintiff in the Motion to Expedite, Vice Chancellor Glasscock focused primarily on the claim regarding management retention, both because it was the most significant and it had not been rendered moot by the Company’s subsequent filing of a definitive proxy statement. Vice Chancellor Glasscock concluded that Plaintiff sought expedited discovery on the grounds that the disclosures were “simply not credible” without providing a factual basis for such assertion.

Because the disclosure claim was speculative, Vice Chancellor Glasscock found that the chance of receiving injunctive relief to be low and that the value of potential disclosure did not outweigh the cost of expedition. The Plaintiff’s Motion to Expedite was denied.

Parsons v. Digital River, Inc., et al., 2015 WL 139760 (Del. Ch. 2015) (Glasscock, V.C.)

Chancery Court Confirms Standing of Record Holder as of Appraisal Demand Date to Pursue Appraisal

By David Bernstein and Meredith Laitner

In Merion Capital LP v. BMC Software, Inc., the Chancery Court held that a person who became the record owner of shares after the record date for voting on a merger could seek appraisal with regard to those shares so long as that person did not vote the shares in favor of the merger, without having to demonstrate that the shares had not been voted in favor of the merger by a prior record owner.

On January 5, 2015, the Delaware Chancery Court issued its ruling in Merion Capital LP v. BMC Software, Inc., C.A. No. 8900-VCG (Del. Ch. January 5, 2015) (Glasscock, V.C.), finding that petitioner Merion Capital LP had standing to seek an appraisal with regard to shares of which it became the record owner after the record date for voting on a merger without having to prove that those shares had not been voted in favor or the merger.

Read More

DGCL §220 Does Not Limit Court’s Ability to Restrict Shareholder Inspection Rights

By Eric Freedman and Eric Taylor

In an en banc decision, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed a decision of the Delaware Court of Chancery holding that the court lacked the authority to impose a specific restriction on a shareholder’s inspection of a corporation’s books and records under section 220(c) of the Delaware General Corporation Law (the “DGCL”). United Technologies Corp. (“UnitedTechnologies”) had sought to restrict the use of information obtained in an inspection of the company’s books and recordsby its shareholder Lawrence Treppel (“Treppel”). Specifically, United Technologies asked Treppel to sign a confidentiality agreement that would require Treppel to bring any legal action “arising out of” the inspection in a Delaware court. Treppel refused to sign the agreement and filed a section 220 action seeking access to United Technologies’ books and records without any such restriction. United Technologies challenged whether Treppel had a “proper purpose” for the information request (as required by section 220(b) of the DGCL), but also asked the Court of Chancery to use its legal authority under section 220(c) to limit the use of information gained from Treppel’s books and records inspection to action in a Delaware court. Section 220(c) grants the court the discretion to “prescribe any limitations or conditions with respect to [an] inspection,” or award such further relief as the court deems proper.

Read More

Chancery Court Confirms Beneficial Owner’s Standing to Pursue Appraisal Action

By David Bernstein and Meredith Laitner

Amid debates around the merits of “appraisal arbitrage,” the Chancery Court held in In re: Appraisal of Ancestry.com, Inc. that the hedge fund petitioner did not need to prove that the Ancestry.com shares of which it became the beneficial owner after the record date for voting on an Ancestry merger had not been voted in favor of the merger in order to pursue appraisal rights with regard to those shares. The Court said any problems with DGCL Section 262 itself should be solved by the legislature, not the courts.

On January 5, 2015, the Delaware Chancery Court issued its ruling in In re: Appraisal of Ancestry.com Inc., C.A. No. 8173-VCG (Del. Ch. January 5, 2015) (Glasscock, V.C.), finding that petitioner Merion Capital L.P., the beneficial owner of Ancestry.com, Inc. shares, did not need to prove that the specific Ancestry shares with respect to which petitioner seeks appraisal were not voted in favor of an Ancestry merger in order to have standing to seek appraisal.

Read More

Copyright © 2024, K&L Gates LLP. All Rights Reserved.